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IMAGINING BOUNDARIES: (POST) HUMANIST UNDERSTANDINGS AND
ECOLOGICAL ETHICS IN THE FICTION OF MARGARET ATWOOD
Chairperson: Dr. Louise Economides
Committee Member: Dr. David Gilcrest
Committee Member: Dr. Marton Marko
Atwood’s  concern  for  the  environment  has  spanned  nearly the entirety of her career,
informing her fears about the future and providing the grounding for her speculative fiction. In
Atwood’s  understanding,  ecological  ruin  stems  from  human  estrangement  from  the  natural  
environment, an estrangement fortified by capitalism and consumerism in contemporary
societies. Instead, she strives to situate the creative, imaginative human species within a larger
natural order that inspires ethical treatment of the more-than-human world. Atwood attempts to
provide us with a model of interconnection and respect for nature that we must imagine if we
desire to avoid the apocalyptic future she describes in her novels. This paper will investigate
three  of  Atwood’s  novels  that  address  issues  concerning  our  interactions  with  nature  and  the
effects of technology.
In Oryx and Crake, humanist and posthumanist understandings of the world cannot
provide individuals with meaning in their radically altered environment. In The Year of the
Flood,  the  second  of  Atwood’s  trilogy,  we  are  introduced  to  the  God’s  Gardeners,  who  
demonstrate how new ethical systems can be enacted within specific subcultural spaces. From
their space on the Edencliff Rooftop Garden, the Gardeners have a critical vantage point by
which to view society and resist the controlling aspects of corporation run state. Atwood gives us
a model by which to imagine enacting change in our own society, and the ethical system that
must be implemented if we wish to avoid ecological ruin.
Finally,  I  turn  to  Atwood’s  second  novel,  Surfacing, to end my discussion. Surfacing
demonstrates that Atwood does not believe that returning to nature is the answer to ecological
problems and the ills of society. The dissatisfaction at the end of the novel hints at the necessity
of humans to exist within communities, as well as the affirmation of traits specific to the human
– creativity and the imagination. The image of personal survival depicted by Surfacing does not
allow for large-scale political or social change. The answer to our dissatisfaction is not to return
to  nature,  but  to,  like  the  God’s  Gardeners,  find  a  way  to  be  both  social  and  natural  – the human
animal.

ii

IMAGINING BOUNDARIES: (POST) HUMANIST UNDERSTANDINGS AND ECOLOGICAL ETHICS IN THE
FICTION OF MARGARET ATWOOD

“How  did  I  myself  come  to  create  my  own  ustopias  – these not-exactly places, which are
anywhere  but  nowhere,  and  which  are  both  mappable  locations  and  states  of  mind?”
Margaret Atwood
INTRODUCTION: EXPLORING USTOPIA IN MARGARET ATWOOD’S FICTION
It goes without saying that our contemporary existence is one of great ambiguity,
confusion, innovation, and hope. With the technological innovations we experience daily, our
future becomes increasingly difficult to imagine. As we move forward into an obscure future, we
continue our attempt to impose systems of meaning and categorization to aid our understanding,
ethically, materially, and ideologically. However, in a rapidly changing world, former means of
understanding cannot hold. As we look toward our future, many of the stories we tell ourselves
seem to be characterized by great hope or devastating ruin. Our future could be utopic, as some
scientists and innovators would have us believe. Technological innovations will outpace
ecological ruin; we will be able to transcend our frail bodies; immortality can be achieved; we
can live forever. Or our future could be apocalyptic. Our technological innovations cannot save
us; scarcity is unavoidable; plagues, famines, and wars are all increasingly likely.
It is from this ambiguity in the stories we tell ourselves about the future that Margaret
Atwood’s  fiction  takes  place.  In  her  treatise  on  speculative  fiction,  SF and Other Worlds,
Atwood  claims,  “Ustopia is a word I made up by combining utopia and dystopia – the imagined
perfect society and its opposite – because, in my view, each contains a latent version of the
other”  (66).  For  Atwood,  our  possible futures of absolute ruinand ultimate hope are twinned. It

1

seems ever more likely that one cannot exist without the other. Utopia cannot be achieved
without someone or something paying a price, while dystopic futures provide some chance of
wiping the slate clean and beginning a different, more hopeful existence. It is within this
ambiguity that Atwood has placed her most recent two novels, Oryx and Crake and The Year of
the Flood, with a third, Maddaddam, soon to be published. We do not yet have the final view of
the new, fictional world she has created, however it is likely to be a world full of ambivalence
about the future, mirroring closely our contemporary existence with all its possibility and fear.
Atwood’s  concern  for  the  environment  has  spanned  the  nearly  the  entirety  of  her  career,  
informing her fears about the future and providing the grounding for her speculative fiction.
When Atwood began her most recent trilogy, she had not planned to start another novel right
away. However, Oryx and Crake began when she saw the melting of the glaciers (“Writing  Oryx
and Crake”  285).  In  Atwood’s  understanding, ecological ruin stems from human estrangement
from the natural environment, an estrangement fortified by capitalism and consumerism in
contemporary societies. Her novels focus on imagining ways to recuperate a means by which to
understand the human as animal and cultural, without denying the special qualities of the human.
Instead, she strives to situate the creative, imaginative human species within a larger natural
order that inspires ethical treatment of the more-than-human  world.  Atwood’s  novels  speculate
on the future in store for humankind if we continue on the path we are on now. At the same time,
Atwood attempts to provide us with a model of interconnection and respect for nature that we
must imagine if we desire to avoid the apocalyptic future she describes in her novels.
This  paper  will  investigate  three  of  Atwood’s  novels  that  address  issues  concerning  our  
interactions with nature and the effects of technology. My first chapter focuses on Oryx and
Crake, describing the society invented by Atwood and the humanist and posthumanist
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alternatives that exist in this possible future. In this fictional future, the human race has been
killed by a commercially developed virus, making room for a group of genetically modified
posthumans, called the Crakers, to begin living in the newly depopulated America. Jimmy,
ostensibly the last human, leads the Crakers out of the lab where they were created, and they take
up residence near the ocean. My first chapter focuses on the character of Jimmy as he attempts to
cling to a humanist framework for meaning – a project that is doomed to fail now that the
human-less world is radically altered. In this way, Atwood depicts a failure of humanism that
cannot help to find a meaningful life in a posthuman environment.
In addition to this failing humanism, posthumanist alternatives cannot help characters
find a meaningful existence either. The posthumans Atwood describes are genetically modified
by  Jimmy’s  childhood  friend,  Crake,  and  are  a  blend  of  animal  and  human  adaptations. As such,
Crake has attempted to remove all biological aspects of the human he believes are responsible
for violence, inequality, greed, and lust. In creating these beings, however, Crake has written a
particular  ethic  into  the  Crakers’  DNA  and  vitiated individual or communal choice as a result.
This posthumanist framework is not a viable alternative to our current situation because it, on
one hand, requires the annihilation of the human species, and, on the other hand, destroys the
possibility of choice that defines ethical considerations.
In The Year of the Flood,  the  second  of  Atwood’s  trilogy,  we  are  introduced  to  the  God’s  
Gardeners, the most uplifting model depicted by Atwood in this future world. The Year of the
Flood, a parallel narrative to Oryx and Crake, follows a different group of individuals though the
same genetically-engineered  apocalypse.  The  God’s  Gardeners  follow  a  self-consciously created
religious system – an imaginative structure that demands respect for all creatures, an
understanding of the human as fallible, and a refusal of corporately produced commodities. The
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Gardeners react to a society that has erased ethical constraints toward the treatment of human
and animal bodies. As a result, all individual bodies are treated as raw material for the production
of more goods in order to sustain a controlling capitalist system. As a result of their beliefs,
many of the Gardeners survive the Waterless Flood and emerge, beginning to create a new
community in depopulated America.
The  God’s  Gardeners demonstrate how non-normative ethical systems can be enacted
within specific subcultural spaces. From their space on the Edencliff Rooftop Garden, the
Gardeners have a critical vantage point by which to view society and resist the controlling
aspects of their Corpocracy – their corporation run state. Their garden space, where they grow
their own food and teach their followers their doctrine, proves to be sustainable as a place of both
political empowerment and personal survival. In this way, Atwood gives us a model by which to
imagine enacting change in our own society, and the ethical system that must be implemented if
we wish to avoid ecological ruin.
Finally,  I  turn  to  Atwood’s  second  novel,  Surfacing, to end my discussion. Surfacing,
written in 1972,  is  an  interesting  text  in  understanding  Atwood’s  oeuvre  as  well  as  
contextualizing her thought on ecological matters. Surfacing depicts a narrator who is disgusted
with the state of Western society, and ends up leaving cultural systems behind to become animal.
In this text, Atwood demonstrates both the constructed conceptual base of terms such as
“human”  and  “natural,”  as  well  as  depicting  dissatisfaction  when  the  narrator  does  give  up  
culture, attempting to become wholly natural. Surfacing demonstrates that Atwood does not
believe that returning to nature is the answer to ecological problems and the ills of society. The
dissatisfaction at the end of the novel hints at the necessity of humans to exist within
communities, as well as the affirmation of traits specific to the human – creativity and the
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imagination. The image of personal survival depicted by Surfacing does not allow for large-scale
political or social change. The answer to our dissatisfaction is not to return to nature, but to, like
the God’s  Gardeners,  find  a  way  to  be  both  social  and  natural  – the human animal.
I conclude my  discussion  of  Atwood’s  work  by  contextualizing  the  characters  and  
ideologies  depicted  within  Donna  Haraway’s  cyborg  framework.  Haraway  describes  an  
ambivalence similar  to  Atwood’s  ustopia;;  technology  presents  great  hope  and  great  power.  The  
cyborg  position,  which  lauds  hybridity  and  a  “pleasure  in  the  confusion  of  boundaries”  (Haraway
8), holds great promise for sociopolitical change. However, as technology continually breaks
down material to be manipulated, the possibilities for control and domination also proliferate.
What is necessary is the responsible construction of boundaries, similar to the work done by the
God’s  Gardeners.  
Atwood’s  fiction  demonstrates  the  power and importance of the imagination in
constructing these boundaries, boundaries we are in dire need of before we disappear down the
rabbit-hole of technology. While technology presents great promise for the future, we must
understand these innovations in a different way if we are to avoid the future depicted in Oryx and
Crake and The Year of the Flood. The  God’s  Gardeners  provide  us  with  a  model  by  which  to  
construct  imaginative  systems  and  subcultural  spaces  that  may  help  us  to  survive.  Like  Atwood’s  
ustopia, we must find boundaries but understand their necessary confusion if we are to imagine a
new future for ourselves.
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CHAPTER 1: HUMANIST & POSTHUMANIST ALTERNATIVES IN ATWOOD’S ORYX AND CRAKE
In Oryx and Crake, Margaret Atwood describes a society, not very far from our own,
where resource shortages and ecological destruction have begun to threaten the sustainability of
the human race. In addition to this ecologically dire situation, capitalism and corporationcontrolled governments have replaced traditional ethical considerations with values based almost
entirely on profit and commodification. In Oryx and Crake, Atwood investigates two possible
alternatives for sustaining the human through the impending apocalypse. The first, a radical
posthumanism, attempts to breed the detrimental human qualities out of the human, creating a
species of posthuman Crakers. The second, traditional humanism, provides the protagonist,
Jimmy, with potential empathy and ethical understandings of others. However, after the
genocidal destruction of the human race, both humanist and posthumanist alternatives fail to
create a meaningful world for the characters. Instead, a new imaginative structure is needed in
order for humanity to survive, one that does not deny our biological heritage, but that also takes
into account the human-as-animal, existing within larger ecological systems.
Margaret  Atwood’s  2003  work  of  speculative  fiction,  Oryx and Crake, tells the story of a
near-future world through the eyes of Jimmy, renamed Snowman, in the post-apocalyptic
landscape. Through flashbacks, Snowman tells the story of a future, centered in America, where
the human race has died out due to the JUVE virus, engineered in a lab and incorporated into the
recently  marketed  BlyssPluss  pill.  The  engineer  of  the  virus  is  Jimmy’s  childhood  friend,  Crake,  
who, in addition to developing the virus, developed a new race of posthumans, termed the
Crakers, by Jimmy. Jimmy, who believes he is the last man existing in this post-apocalyptic
world, watches over the Crakers while trying to survive and reflects on how the world came to be
this way. Through these reflections, Jimmy describes a world separated into sterile, corporation-

6

controlled Compounds and slum-like Pleebands. Within the Compounds, radical experiments in
genetic engineering and gene splicing take place, the results of which create everything from pets
to artificial/real chicken to deadly viruses.
As the novel continues, Jimmy narrates his time at Martha Graham, an academy for the
arts,  as  well  as  Crake’s  time  at  the  Watson-Crick Institute, where Crake begins his experiments
that would lead to the creation of the Crakers. After going to work for Crake, Jimmy meets Oryx,
a woman Jimmy and Crake believe to have first encountered watching child pornography and
who now serves as a teacher to the Crakers. Jimmy/Snowman reflects on his relationship with
her, indicating the intense meaning given to his life by her presence. Sometime after the final
creation of the Crakers, Crake sends virus in the BlyssPluss pill into effect, killing off the
majority  of  the  human  race.  Crake  confronts  Jimmy  and  slits  Oryx’s  throat,  causing  Jimmy  to  
shoot Crake.
My discussion of Oryx and Crake will begin by characterizing the state of the
environment  in  Atwood’s  fictional  world,  as  well  as  the  new  technological  innovations  that  
drastically change the conception of the human body. These new circumstances fundamentally
revise both nature and culture, though these distinctions may not hold, even within our own time.
However, these  new  understandings  become  the  speculative  basis  for  much  of  Atwood’s  
investigation.  I  will  then  examine  Crake’s  understanding  of  the  relation  between  representation  
and reality, a distinction that allows for his ultimate plan, the destruction of the human race and
the  creation  of  the  Crakers.  I  will  proceed  to  discuss  the  failure  of  Crake’s  posthumanist  project  
by investigating the lives of the Crakers. Finally, I will consider  Jimmy’s  humanist  sensibilities  
and the possibilities of these understandings as he enters the post-apocalyptic world as shepherd
of the Crakers.
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REVISING NATURE AND CULTURE
To begin, Oryx and Crake depicts a world where the consequences of global warming
and habitat destruction have come to threaten human sustainability. According to critic Jayne
Glover,
It is becoming ever more obvious that many human practices are not sustainable:
ultimately human beings need more food and space, viable soils, clean air and potable
water  than  the  earth  can  provide…  Oryx and Crake imagines a time which is clearly
suffering from these effects. Atwood has pointed out that part of the novel was written on
a ship in the Arctic where she saw first-hand the melting of the glaciers. (Glover 52)
In Oryx and Crake, Atwood extrapolates from our contemporary society and creates a world that
suffers from all of our current ecological fears. Atwood has long been concerned with ecological
issues,  and  claims,  “I’d  been  clipping  small items from the back pages of newspapers for years,
and  noting  with  alarm  that  trends  derided  ten  years  ago  as  paranoid  had  become  possibilities”  
(“Writing  Oryx and Crake”  285).  Atwood  is  adamant  in  her  definition  of  speculative  fiction;;  she  
includes  “nothing  we  haven’t  already  invented  or  started  to  invent”  (“Writing  Oryx and Crake”  
285).  Atwood’s  depictions  of  the  environment  and  the  ecological  situation  in  Oryx and Crake
have much basis in our contemporary reality.
As  such,  Atwood’s  depictions  of  the environment radically revise how we understand
“nature”  currently.  The  novel  opens  with  Snowman  hearing  the  sound  of  birds:  “The  shrieks  of  
the birds that nest out there and the distant ocean grinding against the ersatz reefs of rusted car
parts and jumbled  bricks  and  assorted  rubble  sound  almost  like  holiday  music”  (3).  The  sound  of  
the  ocean  is  mechanized  as  “grinding”  and  car  parts,  bricks,  and  rubble  replace  coral  reefs  in  this  
new environmental situation. The ocean, once natural, is described as more like a machine than a
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body of water. Additionally, Snowman reflects on various environments that have been altered
by  the  new  weather  patterns  resulting  from  global  warming:  “the  coastal  aquifers  turned  salty  
and the northern permafrost melted and the vast tundra bubbled with methane, and the drought in
the  midcontinental  plains  regions  went  on  and  on,  and  the  Asian  steppes  turned  to  sand  dunes”  
(25).  Even  before  Crake’s  engineered  genocide,  the  likelihood  of  human  sustainability  was  low.  
Technological advances  had  drastically  transformed  the  environment.  In  “Writing  Oryx and
Crake”  Atwood  claims,  “The  rules  of  biology  are  as  inexorable  as  those  of  physics:  run  out  of  
food and water and you die. No animal can exhaust its resource base and hope to survive. Human
civilizations  are  subject  to  the  same  law”  (285).  This  fundamental  transformation  of  the  
environment as a result of humanity draining the earth of its resources forms the foundation of
Atwood’s  thought  experiment  in  both  Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood.
In addition to these new material circumstances depicted by technology altering what
were once understood as natural systems of the earth, Atwood describes the way in which
technological  innovation  has  changed  characters’  understandings  of  the  human body. Formerly,
technology was understood as created by, sustaining, and marking culture. However, as in the
case of the environment, technology is no longer simply a cultural innovation, since it has
entered  the  body,  a  “natural”  being.  Early in Atwood’s  narrative,  Jimmy  witnesses  conflicts  
between his mother and father about the nature of the technologies created by the corporations.
During  one  of  these  numerous  fights,  Jimmy’s  mother  says,  “‘What  you’re  doing  – this pig brain
thing.  You’re  interfering  with  the  building  blocks  of  life.  It’s  immoral.  It’s…  sacrilegious’”  (57).  
In  this  moment,  Jimmy’s  mother  appeals  to  an  original  nature,  a  state  that  should  not  be  
tampered  with.  These  “building  blocks  of  life”  constitute  the  human,  and  as  such,  imply  an ethic
in  their  treatment.  However,  Jimmy’s  father  responds,  “‘It’s  just  proteins,  you  know  that!  
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There’s  nothing  sacred  about  cells  and  tissue  it’s  just…’”  (57).  Jimmy’s  father,  in  his  inability  to  
name  what  it  “just”  is  frames  a  central  question  to  Atwood’s  query,  and  my  own.  How  are  we  to  
define aspects of the body that are increasingly easy to discern and manipulate? How are we to
treat the body ethically from this instrumentalist view? This argument, first described between
Jimmy’s  parents,  forms  a  premise for ethics within the book, and within a society where
bioengineering and gene splicing have become realities. Jimmy will continue to appeal to an
origin – a real, authentic nature that should not be tampered with - in his conversations with
Crake about the biotechnologies encountered in the book. Similarly, Atwood uses the character
of Jimmy to frame those traditional understandings of nature that have been eroded and altered in
her speculative world.
In the ethical debates depicted by the novel, Atwood draws heavily from current
bioethical concerns preoccupying our contemporary society. Ways of ascribing an essential
dignity to the human body are becoming increasingly difficult as radical manipulation of the
genome has become possible. In French DNA, Paul Rabinow highlights the bioethical issues
emerging  in  the  1980’s,  “Representationally,  the  body  was  becoming  simplified,  treated  as  sheer  
raw  material”  where  formerly,  the  “body  was  taken  to  be  sacred,  holistic,  the  container  of  the  
past and the vehicle of the future…  Body  parts  were  entering  into  a  machinery  that  produced  
spiritual  entities”  (101).  In  the  novel,  Jimmy’s  father  expresses  this  latter  view.  There  is  nothing  
sacred about the body; it is raw material to be used for the creation of new and different species,
treatments, and products.
In  the  novel,  new  technologies,  yet  another  important  premise  of  Atwood’s  speculation,  
allow both humanist and posthumanist ideologies to be called into question. These new
technologies, represented largely by genetic engineering, pose a challenge to traditional
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humanism, as Cartesian assumptions are called into question. Is the body the dignified site of
rationality, or something else entirely? Forces of science, technology, and capital simultaneously
threaten  to  reduce  the  human  body  to  “raw  material”  while  producing  once  sacred  “spiritual  
entities.”  Controlling  these  technologies  and  their  ethical  implications  thus  becomes  imperative  
in contemporary society if we wish to maintain the ideas of dignity that formerly ruled the
treatment  of  the  body.  Rabinow  continues:  “Whether  this  particular  humanist  dogma,  and  the  
institutions  that  espouse  it,  will  be  able  to  socialize  these  forces  afterward  remains  unclear”  
(110). This is one of the questions Atwood poses in Oryx and Crake. Can humanist dogma
impose ethical conditions for the treatment of human bodies? Further, can humanist ideologies
hold in a world of ecological peril, where humans are increasingly concerned with their own
survival? On the other hand, what possibilities do posthuman futures hold, given our
technological innovations? Critic Shari Evans characterizes this questioning in the following
way:
Like  much  speculative  fiction,  Atwood’s  novel  suggests  a  moment  of  decision,  the  
moment we occupy now, from which we can see one possibly, problematic path: our lack
of ethical engagement, which ultimately leads to our demise. Oryx and Crake leaves us
with the question of what ethics we can practice to prevent this catastrophe, and ties the
possibility of ethical thought and action to the built environment and ideologies. (37)
Humanist and posthumanist practices seem to be the actions Evans refers to, and the question of
Oryx and Crake becomes whether or not ethics are sustainable within these two positions.
Furthermore,  lack  of  interaction  with  nature,  and  continual  engagement  with  “built”  
environments seems to, in Evans view, preclude ethical considerations within the world of Oryx
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and Crake. It is this issue that Atwood will take up in the second installment of the trilogy, The
Year of the Flood.
In this chapter, I argue, along with Hannes Bergthaller,  that  humanism,  as  well  as  Crake’s  
posthuman  alternative,  seem  doomed  to  fail  in  Atwood’s  fictional  account.  If  humanism  and  
posthumanist  are  the  two  alternatives  were  are  given  to  deal  with  humanity’s  failures  and  the  
subsequent ecological ruin, there seems to be little hope for imagining a new future within Oryx
and CrakeI. As Bergthaller says,
Jimmy and Crake (and the academic institutions they attend) stand for two different ways
of tackling these flaws: traditional humanism, which in Oryx and Crake appears to have
pathetically failed, and an aggressive posthumanism that ruthlessly remodels human
nature  according  to  “ecological”  criteria  – an approach whose triumph the novel depicts
as indistinguishable from catastrophe. (729)
While  Jimmy’s  humanism  fails  him  in  his  attempt  to  deal  with  the apocalypse he has been forced
to  endure,  Crake’s  avid  posthumanism  fails  in  Atwood’s  figuration;;  the  Crakers  do  not  represent  
a  cleansing,  but  a  catastrophe.  As  these  two  alternatives  fail  to  rectify  humanity’s  failed  
ecological existence, Atwood will eventually pose a third alternative in The Year of the Flood.
CRAKE’S POSTHUMANISM
An  investigation  of  Crake’s  posthuman  project  in  developing  the  Crakers  benefits  from  
characterizing the society in which Jimmy and Crake grew up. In terms of the ideologies
governing this society, Atwood effectively demonstrates the many ways in which society has
become unmoored from reality and the resulting ethics derived from such a position. As
Snowman reflects on his childhood and experiences with Crake, it becomes apparent that Crake
and Jimmy grew up in a world where representations did not reflect reality, where, in fact, the
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distinction did not often matter. In these childhood interactions, the fine line between reality and
artifice is eroded quickly. In one of the first interactions we see between Jimmy and Crake, they
play  chess.  Jimmy  wants  to  play  with  a  “real”  set  as  opposed  to  a  virtual  set,  and  Crake  asserts  
that  a  “real”  set  is  not  even  real,  because  the  plastic  chessmen  are,  obviously,  not  real  men.  Crake  
goes  on  to  claim,  “The  real  set  is  in  your  head”  (77).  This  interaction  encompasses  the  tenor  of  
many  of  Jimmy  and  Crake’s  conversations.  Jimmy  appeals  to  an  authentic  “real”  and  Crake  
exposes the real as artifice. These interactions describe Jean Baudrillard’s  notion  of  a  copy1
without  an  original;;  there  was  never  an  “original”  chessboard.  The  virtual  form  of  chess  Jimmy  
and  Crake  play  is  a  copy  of  a  material  chessboard,  the  “reality”  of  which  never  existed,  except  in  
the imagination.
As Jimmy and Crake get older, Crake continues to question reality while Jimmy attempts
to find the distinctions between simulations and reality. On  “shortcircuit.com,  brainfrizz.com,  
and  deathrowlive.com”  Jimmy  and  Crake  watch  executions  (83).  Jimmy  asks,  
“Do  you  think  they’re being  executed?”  he  said.  “A  lot  of  them  look  like  
simulations.”
1

Baudrillard’s  formulation  in  “Simulacra  and  Simulations”  is  an  apt  description of Crake’s  
worldview  that  persists  throughout  the  first  two  novel  of  Atwood’s  trilogy.  As  reality  is  erased  
and the hyperreal takes its place, there  is  no  reality,  no  origin:  “In  this  passage  of  space  whose  
curvature is no longer that of the real, nor of truth, the age of simulation thus begins with the
liquidation of all referentials – worse: by their artificial resurrection in systems of signs, which
are a more ductile material than meaning...”  (Baudrillard  366).  He  continues,  “Then  the  whole  
system becomes weightless; it is no longer anything but a gigantic simulacrum: not unreal, but a
simulacrum, never again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an
uninterrupted  circuit  without  reference  or  circumference”  (368).  In  Crake’s  interrogation  of  the  
real,  he  buys  Baudrillard’s  formulation  wholesale;;  if  everything  is  simulation,  there  is  little  
ethical consideration given to those  material  bodies  that  may  still  be  considered  “real.”  
Furthermore, in his creation of the Crakers, Crake takes a simulation, the pure image of a
ecological  posthuman,  and  embodies  this  image  in  the  material  “real.”  As  Snowman  provides  the  
Crakers with their  fictional  origin  story,  he  is  aware  of  their  status  as  “copies  without  originals”  
as  he  demonstrates,  “a  proliferation  of  myths  of  origin  and  signs  of  reality;;  of  second  hand  truth,  
objectivity  and  authenticity”  (Baudrillard  369).  
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“You  never  know,”  said  Crake.  
“You  never  know  what?”
“What  is  reality?”  (83)
Crake’s  lack  of  faith  in  knowable  “reality”  is  a  frequent  characteristic  of  their  internet  
wanderings. In their highly mediated, sexually depraved, and often violent world, the distinction
makes little sense. The atrocities Jimmy and Crake witness on television are reduced to pure
entertainment, but Jimmy  doubts  the  reality  of  such  acts.  While  Jimmy’s  father  is  creating pigs
with human organs and rakunks to play as pets, the reality of the online executions and
pornography seems possible, if not actual. Jimmy maintains the distinction, however, often
seeming  to  replicate  his  own  mother’s  cry  of  sacrilege  with  his  own cry  of  “Bogus!”  (83).  For  
Crake, the distinction is lost. Everything may be real; everything may be fake. Both terms have
been  emptied  of  meaning,  and  this  lack  of  distinction  allows  for  Crake’s  ultimate  plan.  
Crake’s  interrogation  of  the  real  is  not  limited to their various forms of entertainment, but
instead becomes increasingly problematic as Crake enters a career in the sciences. As Jimmy and
Crake continue their friendship through various stages of their lives, Jimmy becomes invested in
the humanities at Martha Graham, while Crake continues his studies at Watson-Crick. When
Jimmy visits Crake at Watson-Crick, Crake demonstrates the developments of the students at the
institute:
“So  the  butterflies  – are  they  recent?”  Jimmy  asked  after  a  while.  The  ones he was
looking at had wings the size of pancakes and were shocking pink, and were clustering all
over one of the purple shrubs.
“You  mean  did  they  occur  in  nature  or  were  they  created  by  the  hand  of  man?  In  
other  words,  are  they  real  or  fake?”
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“Mm,”  said  Jimmy.  He  didn’t  want  to  get  into  the  what is real thing with Crake.
(200)
In this interaction, Jimmy, in true humanist fashion, attempts to equate reality with nature and
artifice with culture, as culture is defined by technologies. Throughout the novel, Jimmy
continually pushes to discover the boundary between  what  can  be  understood  as  “real,”  or  nature,  
and  the  “fake,”  or  that  which  is,  as  Crake  claims,  “created  by  the  hand  of  man.”  This  boundary  
becomes murky as Crake emphasizes the lack of distinction between the two terms. According to
critic  Jayne  Glover,  Crake  “has  worked  so  long  with  an  instrumentalist  approach  towards  nature  
that he is able to convince himself that animals and insects created in a laboratory are the same as
those naturally occurring in nature and that there are no ethical questions surrounding the
creation  of  new  species”  (53).  Those  organisms  created  by  nature  are,  for  Crake,  the  same  as  
those created in a laboratory. Importantly, his view of reality, which I will expand upon in the
coming paragraphs, does not imply any moral guidance in his continuing scientific experiments.
Crake’s  refusal  to  acknowledge  the  real  in  relation  to  the  artificial  develops  his  ethic, or
lack of ethics, and utilitarian view of the human race. In one exchange, Jimmy and Crake reflect
on an experiment they preformed in High School. After Crake denies that he dreams, Jimmy
claims, “Everyone  dreams,”  Jimmy  said.  ‘”Remember  the  REM-sleep study at HelthWyzer
High?” (218). To which Crake replies, “The  one  where  we  tortured  cats?” (218). Jimmy
responds, correcting Crake: “Virtual  cats,  yeah.  And  the  cats  that  couldn’t  dream  went  crazy.”  
(218). In this particularly telling passage, Crake demonstrates his understanding of the virtual as
real. There is no distinction  between  the  virtual  cats  and  the  real  cats  in  Crake’s  mind,  though  
Jimmy does take the moment to correct him. Thus, real torture and virtual torture are
indistinguishable  to  Crake.  While  the  “torture”  of  cats  was  a  simulation,  Crake  does  not  see  it  as
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such, and the distinction between representation and reality is collapsed. Without the meaning
taken from material reality, where we will see Jimmy forming relationships and deriving
pleasure, Crake has no empathetic framework from which to create ethical relationships. This
lack  of  ethic  is  ultimately  what  allows  for  Crake’s  final  plan  – the destruction of the human race
at the hands of the BlyssPluss pill, clearing the way for the posthuman Crakers to move in.
Crake’s  lack  of  distinction  between  reality and artifice erases any ethical obligation
toward his  fellow  human  beings.  While  Jimmy  is  wondering,  “Why  is  it  he  feels  some  line  has  
been  crossed,  some  boundary  transgressed?  How  much  is  too  much,  how  far  is  too  far?”  (206),  
Crake actively acknowledges  the  erasure  of  any  such  boundary:  “‘I  don’t  believe  in  Nature  
either,’  said  Crake.  ‘Or  not  with  a  capital  N’”  (206).    In  Crake’s  mind,  there  is  no  boundary  
between real/artificial, or human/posthuman to transgress. According  to  Glover,  “It  is  this  
confusion of boundaries which is partly what allows Crake to assume that the natural world –
including its human inhabitants – is part of an enormous laboratory which he has the right to
control”  (53).  This view of the human is what Martin Heidegger warned of in his concept of
standing reserve and echoed by Rabinow in his discussion of current bioethical concerns. In
Heidegger’s  understanding,  technology  has  altered  nature  and  created  a  view  of  nature  as  
material  to  be  used,  constantly  converting  this  “nature”  into material technologies to be held for
potential  use.  In  the  case  of  machines  like  airplanes,  Heidegger  claims,  “Everywhere  everything  
is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on
call for a further ordering…  Yet  an  airliner  that  stands  on  the  runway  is  surely  an  object…  
Revealed, it stands on the taxi strip only as standing reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to insure
the  possibility  of  transportation”  (322).  Nature  is  converted  into  technologies  that  are not valued
as ends in themselves, but are only useful in that they hold the potential for further use. However,
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Heidegger’s  true  warning  comes  when  he  discusses  the  human.  Holding  the  natural  world  in  this  
way is one thing, but Heidegger warns that this idea can be transferred onto the human body as
well:
The current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic gives
evidence of this. The forester who measures the felled timber in the woods and who to all
appearances walks the forest path in the same way his grandfather did is today ordered by
the industry that produces commercial woods whether he knows it or not. He is made
subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the
need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. (323)
Human bodies are not intrinsically valued, as in a humanist sensibility, as sites of meaning,
emotion, individual identity, or communal identification. Bodies become technologies to be held
in  reserve  for  the  end  of  making  paper.  In  this  case,  human  bodies  understood  as  “standing  
reserve”  in  a  technological  society  are  “subordinate”  to  the  cultural  forces  such  as  capitalism,  or  
corporate rule, as in Oryx and Crake. Crake’s  view  of  humans as machine could not be more
apparent  than  when  he  calls  humans  “hormone  robots  anyway,  only  we’re  faulty  ones”  (166).  In  
realizing  Heidegger’s  worst  fear,  humans  and  the  environment  have  become  nothing  but  
material.
Crake’s  lack  of  empathy,  derived  from his inability to distinguish and experience the real,
causes him to view the body as mere material for manipulation and play. Criticism surrounding
the character of Crake largely agrees with this view. Jayne Glover, for instance, highlights the
ecocritical framework in which Crake operates, describing his instrumentalism, or understanding
of the human as apart from nature. According to Glover, this view “has  been  blamed  for  the  
objectification of nature – thus leading to the use of nature as instrument or object. In terms of
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Atwood’s  fictions,  Glover  suggests,  “It  is  this  instrumentalism  that  underpins  the  science  so  
often practised in Oryx and Crake as  the  scientists’  belief  in  their  own  power  leads  them  to  abuse  
their responsibility by treating the natural  world  as  a  mere  plaything”  (52).  Humans become
nothing more than resource, and the destruction of the human race becomes no more than the
clearing of a forest. When torturing a real cat is indistinguishable from torturing a virtual cat,
acting upon the real, be it a human body or other element of nature, can occur without an ethical
framework.  In  Crake’s  understanding,  the  collapse  between  real  and  representation  does  not  
make everything either real or artificial, but instead erases any such understanding of these two
terms. Everything is emptied of meaning, and the world simply becomes material for Crake to
play  with.  It  is  in  this  way  that  Crake  forces  his  representation  of  the  ideal  “human”  into  the  
realm of the real.
On  face  value,  Crake’s  desire  to engineer the “detrimental” qualities out of humans seems
rational. His new creatures have modifications that remove the destructive tendencies of
humankind,  such  as  racism,  hierarchy,  and  sexual  competition.  According  to  Glover,  “Crake’s  
logic here seems valid: if humans are responsible for destroying the world, then it makes sense to
alter  humans  radically  in  order  to  ensure  this  destruction  can  no  longer  continue”  (54).  If  part  of  
the problem is resource shortages as a result of human overpopulation, it makes sense to create a
new species that is ecologically sustainable in an environment that is no longer hospitable toward
humans.  Glover  continues,  “Taken  from  a  certain  perspective,  the  Crakers  therefore  form  an  
ideal community: they are peace-loving vegetarians, designed to live in harmony with both each
other and their environment. There is no rape or sexual abuse, no racial disharmony or
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dominance/submission  culture”  (55).  While  Crake 2, in his disgust with the culture in which he
was raised, does in fact create an admirable, ecologically minded species, Atwood questions the
cost of creating such a being.
Despite  the  ecologically  evolved  status  of  the  Crakers,  Crake’s  posthumanist 3 project
fails for two reasons. First of all, in creating the posthumans, Crake has destroyed all aspects of
humanity,  good  and  bad.  Second,  Crake’s  new  posthuman  world,  is  indistinguishable  from  an  
apocalypse. The Crakers may be an excellent experiment in ecological being, but they come at
the cost of almost all human life. In the first case, according to Bergthaller:
Crake  fully  understands  the  destructive  potential  of  mankind’s  evolutionary  inheritance,  
but he does not appreciate what his revulsion against the latter indicates: that human
beings are not fully determined by that inheritance, and that this lack of determination
allows for the forms of self-domestication that constitute cultural history. His attempt to

2

I am careful to note that not all of Crake alterations in the Crakers are derived from a desire to
create  a  more  ecological  or  sustainable  species.  Instead,  Crake’s  development of the Crakers
hints at other more  aesthetic  or  ideological  alterations  that  demonstrate  Crake’s  hubris as an
archetypical  “mad  scientist”  character.  The  simple  fact  that  Crake  believes  he  has  the  capability  
to  diagnose  the  human  race,  alter  those  “detrimental”  attributes,  and  exterminate  the  remaining  
humans  displays  Crake’s  great  hubris.  Furthermore, aesthetically, Crake has given the Crakers
his own green eyes. These literally parentless creatures have a metaphorical father in Crake as
their  eyes  are  identical  to  his  own.  Despite  the  fact  that  Crake  claims  “But  human  beings  hope  
they can stick their souls into someone else, some new version of themselves, and live on
forever”  (120),  he  demonstrates  a  surprisingly  humanist  inclination  in  “fathering”  the  Crakers.  
3

It  should  be  noted  that  the  definitions  of  “posthumanism”  are  widely  disputed  as  technological
modifications continually change our perception of the traditional definitions of the human. In
this  paper,  I  align  most  closely  with  Cary  Wolfe’s  definitions  from  What is Posthumanism?
Wolfe outlines posthumanism as the questioning that comes after humanism, not just the
intensification  of  humanist  values  such  as,  “escaping  or  repressing  not  just  its  animal  origins  in  
nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by transcending the bonds of
materiality  and  embodiment  altogether”  (xv).  As  such,  the  Crakers  present  a  true  posthumanist  
alternative, as Crake does not wish to intensify humanism, as transhumanism does, but instead
dissolve those aspects of the human responsible for the violence, death, and inequality he sees in
society.
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do humanism one better in effect cancels out the conditions of its own possibility,
foreclosing the very space of biological indeterminacy within which alone the imperative
from the Rilke fridge magnet – “you  must  change  your  life”  – can make sense.
(Bergthaller 737)
Due to his revulsion against human culture, Crake rewrote the  Crakers’  biology; the Crakers are,
quite literally, word made flesh. The representation of an ideal creature that Crake held in his
mind  has,  through  technology,  been  made  into  a  “real”  body. However, in the process of this
revision Crake has foreclosed upon the possibility of choice and the ability to change, as the
dictum  on  his  fridge  magnet  suggests.  Shari  Evans  claims,  “In  some  ways,  the  Crakers  are  the  
end result of the Enlightenment project – a scientific experiment that attempts to erase all
imagination, passion, and desire from the human  condition”  (48).  Instead  of  understanding  the  
special qualities of Homo sapiens, rationality and creativity, that create death and destruction as
well as life and art, Crake erases all of these qualities in the Crakers. Glover, evoking ecocritic
Kate Soper,  suggests  that  a  special  quality  of  the  human  is  the  “ability  to  reflect  upon  the  
characteristics of nature and humanity which separates us from non-human nature: at the crux of
much ecological thinking is the problem that humans are both a part of nature and apart from
nature.  Crake’s  rejection  of  ‘culture’  therefore  is  a  rejection  of  part  of  what  makes  us  human”  
(57). Crake is unable to imagine the human as both natural and apart from nature. Instead Crake,
in the second failing of his avid posthumanism, attempts to erase all aspects of the human from
the earth, making the JUVE virus active and killing off the human race.
JIMMY/SNOWMAN’S HUMANISM
Jimmy, though not the most admirable of characters, still displays a superior appreciation
for human qualities and an enhanced ability to relate to others when compared to Crake. Before

20

Crake sends the JUVE virus into effect, Jimmy sees the body not as material to be manipulated,
but  as  a  site  of  pleasure  and  emotion.  Previous  to  the  “zero  hour”  (3)  Jimmy  had found pleasure
in the body. He frequently questions food, not only in interest of where it came from (real versus
artificial)  but  also  in  terms  of  its  quality.  To  this  questioning,  Crake  responds  “indifferently”  by  
saying  “‘It’s  food’”  (201).  Crake,  always  utilitarian,  doesn’t  take  pleasure  in  food,  as  Jimmy  
does. Jimmy frequently reflects on and describes its presence in various interactions, as in the
pizza that is always present during his nights with Oryx (122). These sexual encounters with
Oryx are often  paired  with  food,  as  he  reflects  on  “pizza,  then  Oryx’s  fingers  in  his  mouth”  
(122).  In  Snowman’s  reflections  on  his  relationship  with  Oryx,  he  thinks,  “Then  joy,  crushing  his  
whole body in its boa-constrictor grip. Oh stolen sweet picnics. Oh sweet delight. Oh clear
memory,  oh  pure  pain.  Oh  endless  night”  (122).  Sex,  joy,  and  pain  are  all  experienced  through  
the body, feelings that Crake seems incapable or indifferent towards experiencing.
Additionally, Atwood seems to describe the body, particularly the face, as a site where
empathy and interconnectedness can be understood between human subjects. Jimmy and Crake,
in their internet wanderings, believe that their first encounter with Oryx was on a website,
HottTotts, featuring child pornography. Critic Stephen  Dunning  has  described  Oryx  as  “the  
exploited third-world  ‘Other,’  victim  of  an  imperialistic,  commercialized  ‘phallic’  gaze”  (96).  
Jimmy  describes  Oryx,  at  age  eight,  as  she  turned  to  look  at  the  camera:  “Then  she  looked  over  
her shoulder and right into the eyes of the viewer – right  into  Jimmy’s  eyes,  into  the  secret  
person inside him. I see you, that look said. I see you watching. I know you. I know what you
want”  (91).  Jimmy  and  Crake’s  experiences  on  the  internet call into question the differences
between simulations and reality, as Crake continually asserts; however, the look Oryx gives
Jimmy at this time mutually individuates Oryx and Jimmy. Oryx denies her status as an object
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and  reasserts  herself  as  a  subject,  a  speaking  “I,”  while  Jimmy  transforms  from  a  “viewer”  
consuming a product into Jimmy, a individuated human with ethical obligations to another
human.  “Jimmy  felt  burned  by  this  look  – eaten  into,  as  if  by  acid.  She’d  been  so  contemptuous  
of  him…  But  for  the  first  time  he’d  felt  what  they’d  been  doing  was  wrong.  Before,  it  had  always  
been  entertainment,  or  else  far  beyond  his  control,  but  now  he  felt  culpable”  (91).  This  look  is  a  
moment of recognition, in which Oryx recognizes something about her audience and their desires
and Jimmy recognizes the common humanity in Oryx. Most importantly, however, this act of
looking  demands  an  ethic  from  Jimmy.  Jimmy’s  recognition  of  Oryx’s  subjectivity  leads  him  to  
the conclusion that they are doing something wrong in watching the depraved objectification of
children on HottTotts. Something in the look alerts Jimmy to the vulnerability of Oryx as well as
her demand to be treated as human.
In Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Judith Butler calls for a
recognition of the other in terms of an acknowledgement of the vulnerability in the other. One
way in which this recognition is achieved is through the face in the mutual act of looking. Butler
conceives of this recognition as the desire for both subjects to be recognized as desiring to be
recognized:
Consider that the struggle for recognition in the Hegelian sense requires that each partner
in the exchange recognize not only that the other needs and deserves recognition, but also
the each, in a different way, is compelled by the same need, the same requirement. This
means that we are not separate identities in the struggle for recognition but are already
involved in a reciprocal exchange, an exchange that dislocates us from our positions, our
subject-positions, and allows us to see that community itself requires the recognition that
we are all, in different ways, striving for recognition. (43-44)
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Jimmy may not fully recognize his desire for recognition yet; it is not until after the human
pandemic that he realizes his desire for community with other humans. However, the look that he
exchanges with Oryx does work to redefine her as a subject in relation to Jimmy, who now feels
personal,  ethical  obligation  to  Oryx  due  to  this  look.  Butler  also  emphasizes  that,  “To  ask  for  
recognition, or to offer it, is precisely not to ask for recognition of what one already is. It is to
solicit a becoming, to instigate a transformation, to petition the future always in relation to the
Other”  (44).  This  mutual  becoming,  as  opposed  to  recognition4 of  “what  one  already  is,”  is  
certainly  depicted  in  Oryx  and  Jimmy’s  interaction.  In  looking  for  recognition,  Oryx  demands  
personhood and a new future for herself, while Jimmy realizes the ethics of his behavior,
recognizing his culpability and desire to change. The future is transformed for both these
characters by this look, as they meet in life and imagination throughout the remainder of the
novel.
While I have stressed the importance of the material body and its relation to meaning, it
should be noted, however,  that  both  Butler  and  Atwood’s  depiction  of  this  act  of  recognition  is  
heavily mediated. Butler admits that many of our interactions with the Other come through
media  representations.  Oryx  and  Jimmy’s  interaction  is  confined  to  the  internet,  where Jimmy
can see her face, but Oryx cannot see his. In the proliferation of technology, we are hard pressed
to find interactions with others that are not subject to this type of mediation. Despite this
estrangement  from  material  bodies,  Jimmy  and  Oryx’s  look demonstrates that we are still able to
find  mediated  representations  that  result  in  empathy  with  the  other.  Butler  suggests,  “The  reality  
is not conveyed by what is represented within the image, but through the challenge to
representation that reality delivers”  (146).  It  is  not,  as  in  Crake’s  case,  the  disparity  between  
4

Butler stresses the importance of the face in this act of recognition. Evoking Emmanuel
Levinas,  Butler  emphasizes  that  the  face  is  the  site  that  demands  the  ethic  “Thou  shalt  not  kill.”
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representation and reality that troubles Jimmy, but instead his experience of reality that
challenges  the  representation.  He  recognizes,  in  Oryx’s  look,  that  he  is  not  an  anonymous  viewer  
consuming a product; his former reality as a disconnected consumer absorbing entertainment is
challenged  by  the  representation/reality  of  Oryx  looking  at  him  and  saying,  simply,  “I  see  you.”  
His previous reality is challenged by the mediated representation he is faced with, and he is faced
with a new reality, reinvesting Oryx with personhood and himself with culpability.
However,  Jimmy’s  empathy  and  understanding  of  the  human  other,  demonstrated  in  these  
encounters with Oryx, is dependent upon there being other humans to relate to.
Jimmy/Snowman, as his name change indicates, presents a liminal position between a humanist
past  and  a  posthuman  future.  After  the  “zero  hour,”  Jimmy  cannot  relate  to  the  Crakers  as  he  did  
with  humans.  Humans,  in  their  imperfection,  were  something  that  “used  to  move  him,  the  flaws  
in the design: the lopsided smile, the wart next to the navel, the mole,  the  bruise”  …“But  these  
new  women  are  neither  lopsided  nor  sad:  they’re  placid,  like  animated  statues.  They  leave  him  
chilled”  (100).  Jimmy’s  humanist  ideals  do  not  hold  in  his  posthuman  existence  as  he  takes  up  
the role of shepherd to the Crakers. Obviously,  Jimmy’s  humanist  ideals  cannot  hold  in  a  world  
without humans.
Additionally, after Snowman leads the Crakers out of the Paradice compound and into the
“real”  world,  his  understanding  of  his  body,  mediated  or  otherwise,  is  drastically  altered.  The
body is no longer a site of pleasure, but it is instead maladapted, imperfect, and ugly in
relationship  to  both  the  Crakers  and  the  harsh  environment.  Crake’s  writing  of  the  body  of  the  
Crakers drastically alters their interaction with their environment, which Atwood effectively
characterizes by showing them in relation to Jimmy. If we construct our individual identities
from our relation to the other, be it other humans, posthumans, or the environment, Crake has
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effectively reconstituted the meaning of the  Craker’s  lives  through  writing  their  bodies.  They  
interact peacefully with their environment in a sustainable and ecological manner. Not only are
the Crakers inhumanly beautiful, Crake has built in several features. The Crakers heal by
purring, and Jimmy  claims  Crake  “turned  himself  inside  out  in  the  attempt  to  install  the  feature”  
(156). Crakers have a special chemical in their urine, allowing them to mark territory, smell
citrusy to repel insects, and produce caecotrophs to get all the nutrients out of their food (156).
The Crakers are perfectly adapted to their environment, as they are written for the degraded
environment  they  inhabit.  Jimmy’s  rhetoric  of  “installing  features”  further  likens  Crake’s  work  
to  the  building  of  a  machine.  Heidegger’s  transformation of the human (or posthuman) into
material  resources  is  actualized  to  an  extreme  in  Crake’s  creation  of  these  posthumans.
In contrast to the Crakers, Snowman sees the environment as his antagonist, a constant
force to be battled at all hours. This  battle  is  described  from  the  outset  of  the  novel:  “The  ants  
have  got  in,  even  though  he  tied  the  bag  as  tightly  as  he  could.  Already  they’re  running  up  his  
arms,  the  black  kind  and  the  vicious  little  yellow  kind”  (4).  Snowman  is  unable  to  take  pleasure  
in  his  environment,  describing  the  birds  and  claiming  that,  “In  a  former  life  he  might  have  snuck  
up on them, studied them through binoculars, wondering at their grace. No, he never would have
done  that,  it  hadn’t  been  his  style”  (148).  Registered  in  this  moment  is  Snowman’s  recognition  of  
how nature used to be viewed before zero-hour - something to wonder at as pastoral or sublime as well as some regret for not having done so. As the environment has been othered as an
antagonist, his ability to take pleasure from nature has been reduced. The ants are out to bite him,
and  the  pigoons  plot  against  him.  Furthermore,  Snowman’s  reduction  to  a  form  of  primitivism  is  
made evident by his appearance – his caveman-esque wrapping made of a sheet from one of his
“hunting”  expeditions.  Jimmy,  in  his  new  habitat,  is  forced  to  encounter  his  maladapted  body  as  
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disgusting, frail, and painful. In this lack of identification with his own body, Jimmy experiences
the abject. Jimmy encounters the limits of the material when removed from the culture in which
his body was formed.
Furthermore,  human  systems  of  language  are  not  maintained  in  Jimmy’s  relations  with  
the Crakers. Bergthaller claims:
Both Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood are principally concerned with the
question of what role language, literature and, more generally, the human propensity for
symbol-making can play in our attempts to deal with the ecological crisis – a crisis that
Atwood  describes  as  arising  from  flaws  in  humanity’s  biological  make-up. (Bergthaller
729)
Language, literature, and symbol-making, traditionally taken as markers of humanity, seem to
lose any definition when they are robbed of their communicative function. Whereas Jimmy was
once a word man, taking great delight in old self-help manuals and collections of dated words
from his days at Martha Graham, Snowman cannot maintain these linguistic systems of meaning
in his new environment. Snowman attempts to maintain these humanist sensibilities in his
unfamiliar environment despite the lack of cultural systems to give his attempts meaning.
Jimmy’s  collections  of  words  have  lost  all  function  without  other  humans  to  communicate  with.  
As Alan Sinfield claims, “Meaning,  communication,  language  work  only  because  they  are  
shared”  (Sinfield  742).  Ways of making meaning in the world are dependent upon others with
which  to  share  these  systems.  In  speaking  of  ideology,  Sinfield  continues,  “Ideology  makes  sense  
for us – of us – because it is already proceeding when we arrive in the world, and we come into
consciousness  in  its  terms”  (745).  This  observation  marks  the  difference  between  
Jimmy/Snowman  and  the  Crakers.  Jimmy  was  born  into  what  we  could  consider  “our”  ideology  -
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the  world  Atwood  and  her  readers  exist  within.  However,  due  to  Crake’s  careful  material and
ideological construction of the Crakers, they are born into a different ideology, preventing
Jimmy  from  interacting  meaningfully  with  them.  The  failure  of  humanism,  in  Jimmy/Snowman’s  
existence, stems from this difference; humanist sensibilities cannot be maintained when removed
from their cultural context. By exploring the last man scenario, Atwood questions another tenet
of humanism – the  autonomy  of  the  individual.  Jimmy’s  position  is  a  final  test  of  humanism,  as  
he exists alone, in nature. Atwood demonstrates that the individual cannot be the source of truth
and  meaning,  as  humanism  would  have  us  believe.  Jimmy’s  failure  to  find  a  meaningful  
existence demonstrates that ways of understanding and being in the world are formed elsewhere,
in social, communicative systems.
Additionally, Snowman continually speaks old words and adages in his new environment
despite  the  lack  of  relation  between  his  representations  and  his  reality.  However,  “Language  
itself had lost its solidity; it had become thin, contingent, slippery, a viscid film on which he was
sliding around like an eyeball on a plate. An eyeball that could still see, however. That was the
trouble”  (260).    While  he  still  takes  in  his  environment,  experiencing  and  processing  it,  there  is  
no meaning in language without its communicative properties. Snowman attempts to maintain
language, his last recourse for meaning, in a world that has turned his body against him. Words,
even at the beginning of Oryx and Crake, provided Snowman some respite from his situation.
However,  these  words  have  been  transformed  and  “there  was  no  longer  any  comfort  in  the  
words. There was nothing in them. It no longer delighted Jimmy to possess these small
collections of letters that other people had forgotten about. It was like having his own baby teeth
in  a  box”  (261).  Language  is  past  use,  a  relic  that  is  as  useful  as  a  tooth  in  a  box.  Language  can  
only be kept for sentimental reasons, with no utility left. Jimmy can no longer experience the
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material world as it was, so he attempts to find the meaning and pleasure in life from his
collections of words. However, without an external, material referent to provide these words with
meaning,  the  power  of  Jimmy’s  language  is  lost.
The breakdown of systems of understanding between Snowman and the Crakers is
another way in which the loss of language registers in the novel. At one point, Snowman slips up
and  says,  “‘And  he’s  telling  me  that  if  you  don’t  stop  doing  that  you’ll  all  be  toast.’”  To  which  
the  Crakers  respond,  “‘Please,  oh  Snowman,  what  is  toast?’”  (97).  Snowman  then  imagines  the  
conversation that would ensue if he tried to explain toast to the Crakers:
Toast is when you take a piece of bread – What is bread? Bread is when you take some
flour – What  is  flour?  We’ll  skip  that  part,  it’s  too  complicated…  Toast  was  a  pointless  
invention from the Dark Ages. Toast was an implement of torture that caused all those
subjected to it to regurgitate in verbal form the sins and crimes of past lives. Toast was a
ritual item devoured by fetishists in the belief that it would enhance their kinetic and
sexual powers. Toast cannot be explained by any rational means. Toast is me. I am toast.
(98)
Snowman demonstrates the way in which a simple phrase has lost all communicative power in
his interactions with the posthuman Crakers. Although the Crakers have been given some
language and understanding, Jimmy is never satisfied by his interactions with them.
Furthermore,  Jimmy’s  active myth-making with the Crakers is one way in which Atwood warns
against institutionalized forms of meaning being necessarily constructed and thus fraught and
inaccurate. Jimmy has created a theology for the Crakers that is self-consciously contrived. In
this imaginary conversation about the meaning of toast, Snowman demonstrates the ease with
which systems of meaning can be created if language remains unmoored from reality. The
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Crakers literally would have believed anything about toast if Jimmy had told them, exposing the
arbitrary nature of language at its worst representational moments. In this passage, toast takes on
the power of a sacrament, imbued with all the mysticism of religious dogma and all made up on
the spot by Snowman. Jimmy/Snowman, the word man, exposes to himself that the words he has
relied on to make sense of his world are now and were always arbitrary constructions. In his
inability to take pleasure from his body, and the failure of language to create meaning in his new
environment, Jimmy/Snowman demonstrates the failure of humanism to overcome the
challenges of ecological peril and make meaning of these posthuman realities.
In Oryx and Crake,  Atwood’s  description  of  Crake  provides  us  with  an  example  of  a  
view of the human as mere material to be used for the creation of a new human race. As such,
this material  can  be  discarded  without  ethical  implications.  In  Crake’s  Paradice  compound  where  
he creates the Crakers, representations have entered the body of the real as bodies become texts
to  be  revised  and  rewritten.  Crake’s  experiments  demonstrate  representation made real, and this
demonstrates a loss of any originary nature, no matter how tenuously conceived. His inability to
discern artifice from reality and the essential collapse of the two terms, does not allow him to
encounter unmediated reality or empathy through the body, as a site of pleasure or meaning. The
creation of the Crakers demonstrates the failure of posthumanism, as their creation erases any
conception of the human and vitiates any possibilities for free will or choice. This new
posthuman world is indistinguishable from an apocalypse as the rampant virus kills off the
human race.
Jimmy,  by  contrast,  maintains  a  humanist  position  that  claims,  “When  any  civilization is
dust  and  ashes…art  is  all  that’s  left  over.  Images,  words,  music.  Imaginative  structure. Meaning
– human meaning, that is – is  defined  by  them.  You  have  to  admit  that’”  (167).  In  this  view,  
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material civilization may be altered, but representational systems persist in the form of art. It is
this distinction that creates a space for meaning and a standard by which to judge human nature
over time. Representational structures unite humans over millennia and create heritage, tradition,
and a conception of a common humanity - in short, meaning. Snowman gets the chance to
experience and test this hypothesis firsthand. Civilization is indeed dust and ashes, and images,
words, and music are losing their ability to create meaning. Snowman occupies this liminal space
between the human and posthuman, and it may be, with a lack of humans, that these
representational forms can no longer hold. Meaning is constituted through these imaginative
structures under the assumption that there are other humans to relate to – those that have come
before and those that will come after. As McKibben claims, bioengineering creates the
possibility  that  the  new  human  will  “glance  back  over  his  shoulder  and  see  a  gap  between  
himself  and  human  history…  he  won’t  be  able  to  look  forward  either.  He  won’t  be  able  to  
imagine  himself  connected  with  those  who  will  come  after  him” (64-65). Snowman is poised at
the point between the end of the human and the beginning of a new future as he encounters other
surviving humans at the end of the novel (374). However, he is unable to relate to either group.
The lack of correlation between his imaginative systems and his material reality leaves him in a
life devoid of meaning.
Jimmy, with his humanist sensibilities and reliance on words embodies the double bind of
representationalism that Atwood continues to investigate in The Year of the Flood. According to
Bergthaller:
Jimmy and Crake thus have two different but equally flawed answers to the problem of
taming  the  human  animal…  Jimmy…  represents  a  humanism  that  fails  to  understand  
itself as a bio-political project. He is fully alive to the thrill of artistic beauty, yet does not
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understand that it is meaningful not in itself, but because it provides a way of coping with
the conflicting tendencies rooted in our biological being. What is absent from Oryx and
Crake is a perspective that would, as it were, put these two half-understandings together.
(Bergthaller 737)
Jimmy is incapable of relating his mind to his body in his experiences after the zero hour. He is
aware and appreciative of the possibilities of humanism in his ability to relate to other humans;
however, he is unable to maintain these systems when faced with the reality of his body and
existence in nature. In a sense, humanist structures only make sense within culture. When Jimmy
attempts to carry these structures into nature, he fails miserably. Glover further emphasizes this
point,  saying,  “For  after  all,  what  Atwood  appear  to  be  saying  in  Oryx and Crake is that being
human means being an ethical, cultural and creative, as well as the animal that is homo sapiens”  
(60). What Oryx and Crake lacks is this both/and, or an understanding of the human as both
biological and cultural. Oryx and Crake does not provide us with a way of resolving humanism
and posthumanism, or nature and culture; however, Atwood introduces one way of
understanding these problematic dualisms in The Year of the Flood. Through representations
provided by technology and capital, human bodies are reduced to material, a transformation that
is further depicted in the treatment of female bodies in The Year of the Flood. While, at the end
of Oryx and Crake, Atwood presents a bleak view of the humanist project in response to extreme
posthumanist alternatives and ecological peril, she will attempt to recuperate representationalism
with  the  introduction  of  the  God’s  Gardeners in The Year of the Flood. Bergthaller claims, “Oryx  
and Crake thus ends with a conceptual impasse that Atwood attempts to resolve in The Year of
the Flood by retrenching to a qualified humanism informed by evolutionary biology and
disenchanted with human nature”  (729).  Grounding  these  representations  in  self- conscious
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religious systems that stress ecological interconnectedness and the dignity of matter, Atwood
depicts a group of humans that make it out of the apocalypse engineered by Crake to carry on
and repopulate the earth.
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CHAPTER 2: CULTIVATING THE GARDEN: SUBCULTURAL SPACE FOR IMAGINATION & ETHICS IN
MARGARET ATWOODS’S THE YEAR OF THE FLOOD
In our contemporary world, we have become increasingly aware of the manner in which
our cultural productions have come to affect the natural environment. As demonstrated by Oryx
and Crake, Atwood’s  recent  fiction  has  become  ever  more  concerned  with  environmental
collapse and resource shortages. Disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012 or the Fukushima
nuclear meltdown of 2011, provide us with examples of the ways in which the technologies
created by modernity have penetrated the natural. As radioactive material travels on currents
across the Pacific Ocean and Hurricane Sandy brings the realities of global warming to
America’s  front  door,  we  can  no  longer  ignore  the  ways  in  which  our  cultural  productions  have  
infiltrated what were formerly understood as the natural systems of the earth. Both in our
representations  of  “nature”  and  our  material  experience of this realm, cultural systems threaten to
overwhelm nature, and, perhaps, already have. It has become increasingly difficult to determine
what constitutes the  “natural”  and  the  “cultural,”  the  detrimental  effects of which are
demonstrated  in  Crake’s  instrumentalist  view  of  nature.  Given  these  circumstances,  in  The Year
of the Flood Atwood asks us to consider if imaginative structures can work to reinstate ethics in
our interactions with others, and what political possibilities there might be for restoring these
ethics within cultural ideologies.
In  our  postmodern  existence,  we  are  living  with  what  Fredric  Jameson  termed  “the  
radical  eclipse  of  nature”  (34).  Jameson  frames  the  problem  of  this  postmodern  existence  as  “the  
prodigious  new  expansion  of  multinational  capital…  penetrating  and  colonizing  those  very  
precapitalist enclaves (Nature and the Unconscious) which offered extraterritorial and
Archimedean footholds  for  critical  effectivity”  (49).  Without  access  to  nature,  an  originary  space  
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outside culture, we are unable,  in  Jameson’s  understandings, to gain the critical distance
necessary to effect political change. We need, as Atwood demonstrates in her most recent
trilogy,  new  ways  of  thinking,  new  ways  of  imagining,  a  new  “cognitive  map”  (Jameson  54) in
order to understand the present and the self in relation to the Other, be it human or non human. In
a society that threatens to collapse human and natural identities into materials to be used by the
systems of capital, we need to impose a new system of understanding upon our relations with the
world in order to inspire a new ethic.
Atwood’s  fiction  provides  us  with  one  possibility  for  a  new  system  of  understanding.
More than just dystopic story telling, Atwood both imparts a warning and proposes a new ethic
of relationality between the self and other. In many of her fictions, Atwood has demonstrated her
prescience in diagnosing contemporary society. In Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood,
Atwood again takes our current society to task as she charts a trajectory from our contemporary
society into a post-apocalyptic, posthuman, dystopian future. In Oryx and Crake, Atwood
describes a divided America ruled by corporations that sell genetic modifications as the newest
commodity fetish. As the novel progresses, these commodities, engineered to contain a virus,
lead to the downfall of the human race, making room for the posthuman Crakers to take up
residence in the now depopulated America. As Atwood continues this story in The Year of the
Flood,  the  parallel  narrative  follows  a  group  called  the  God’s  Gardeners  through  the  same  
apocalypse.
The Year of the Flood, I would argue, has much to say about resistance to the controlling
methods of capital as well as the state of the human in relation to the other, outside the realm of
capitalist concerns. With  her  depiction  of  the  God’s  Gardeners,  Atwood describes the formation
of a subculture at it reacts against the ideals of the dominant culture. I would argue that the
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God’s  Gardeners  react  to  an  objectification  of  both  the  human  body  and  land  that  collapses  the  
distinction between representation and reality, thus offering all matter up to the productive
systems of capital. The new imaginative system Atwood provides us with is a recursively
constructed  cosmology,  in  which  the  God’s  Gardeners  apply  themselves  to  a  religious  system  
that takes into account the fallibility of man, the ecological connectedness of all things, and the
ethics that are derived from such understandings. This new ideology attempts to rectify the
failures  of  Jimmy’s  humanism  and  Crake’s  posthumanism  depicted  in  Oryx and Crake. As such,
the Gardeners recognize their inclusive position, human and animal, cultural and natural.
Ultimately, Atwood demonstrates a subculture that survives when the dominant culture falls
upon  its  own  sword,  and  reimagines  a  new,  ethical  relation  to  the  world  as  the  God’s  Gardeners  
emerge from the disaster they have termed the Waterless Flood.
This chapter will  begin  by  characterizing  the  culture  in  which  the  God’s  Gardeners  
reside, a culture that has given both nature and human bodies up to the capitalist system as raw
material, in a continuation of the discussion in Oryx and Crake.  I  will  then  investigate  the  God’s  
Gardeners as a subculture, standing against the dominant cultural and political ideologies, as a
means of effecting political change as well as individual survival. Finally, I will investigate the
religious ideology constructed  by  the  God’s  Gardeners  as  an  imaginative  structure  that  provides  
these individuals with an ethic and, ultimately, a means of survival.
BODIES AS RAW MATERIAL: REPRESENTATION & COMMODIFICATION
Atwood’s  second  installment  of  the  trilogy  follows  two female characters, Ren and Toby,
through  their  lives  before  joining  the  God’s  Gardeners,  their  time  with  the  God’s  Gardeners,  and  
their  time  after  the  “Waterless  Flood,”  characterized  by  the  mass  extinction  of  the  human  race  
engineered by the corporations.  The  Waterless  Flood  “was  not  an  ordinary  pandemic:  it  wouldn’t  
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be  contained  after  a  few  hundred  deaths,  then  obliterated  with  biotools  and  bleach”  (20).  The
Waterless Flood could not be prevented or cured by further technological innovations. Instead
the  outbreak  “had  all  the  signs:  it  travelled  through  the  air  as  if  on  wings,  it  burned  through  cities  
like fire, spreading germ-ridden  mobs,  terror,  and  butchery”  (20).  Ren  and  Toby’s  experience  of  
their society as women before the flood occurs constitutes an important ecofeminist critique of
biocapitalism that cannot be ignored. Their experience of society is similar to that of the
characters in Oryx and Crake, but  Atwood’s  use  of  the  female  perspective  adds  important  
extensions and qualifications to the society she describes. Their reflections on society before the
flood provide a means by which to understand the ruin of society enacted in the Waterless Flood.
Ecofeminism describes a relation between nature and the feminine suggesting that a
society that subjugates women is a society that also typically subjugates nature. Ecofeminists
have made the argument against an ethic that situates the self against the other in a way that
indicates a hierarchy, and thus a logic of domination. Val Plumwood describes this hierarchy as
the constructed ground of rationality: “Reason in the western tradition has been constructed as
the privileged domain of the master, who has conceived nature as a wife or subordinate other
encompassing and representing the sphere of materiality, subsistence and the feminine which the
master has split off and  constructed  as  beneath  him” (3). Reason’s  equating  of  the  female  and  the  
natural cannot be overstated. This formulation is largely achieved through a discourse which
both naturalizes women and feminizes nature, allowing masculine domination to occur (Soper
139). In one historic example of this formulation, Carolyn Merchant points out that during the
15th century nature and women were equated through discourse, providing the framework for
their  domination:  “Sensitive  to  the  same  social  transformations  that  had  already  begun  to  reduce  
women to psychic and reproductive resources, Bacon developed the power of language as a
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political  instrument  in  reducing  female  nature  to  a  resources  for  economic  production”  
(Merchant 165). In this particular understanding, women occupy a more material existence than
men  due  to  their  “role[s]  in  reproduction”  making  the  female  “a  more  corporeal  being  than  the  
male”  (Soper  139).  This  corporeal  existence of women is not empowering but is instead a ground
for domination. Women, described though this discourse, do not have access to the cultural
markers that indicate rationality, civilization, and humanity that characterize a Western, male
existence. They are reduced to representations of reproductive function, occupying the realm of
emotion, animality, and nature.
In this way, ecofeminism offers an important understanding of the human body,
especially the human female body, as equitable to nature within a patriarchal ethos. However,
while reproductive value is one why of understanding the commodification of bodies (as Atwood
has investigated in A  Handmaid’s  Tale), The Year of the Flood depicts a society that has
totalized the commodification of all parts of all bodies. When nature, understood as resource to
be used for the creation of new goods, is extended to the human body, this relation takes on an
ethical component in the use of human bodies as commodity. Our contemporary society
maintains laws against prostitution for precisely this reason. Once bodies become commodified,
the  intrinsic  worth  typically  maintained  as  a  “self-evident”  right  goes  the  way  of  any  other  
material object. Atwood warns against this view quite clearly in The Year of the Flood.
Prostitution  has  become  legal  “when  they  outlawed  the  pimps  and  the  street  trade  – for public
health and the safety of women, they said – and rolled everything into SeksMart under
CorpSeCorp  control”  (7).  The  sex  trade  proliferates  and  the  exploitation  of  female  bodies  is  
detailed  in  Ren’s  accounts  after  she  leaves  the  God’s  Gardeners.  Prostitution  is  sanctioned and
supported by corporations, predicated through a discourse, not of profit, but of “health  and  
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safety.”  The  girls  who  work  at  Scales  and  Tails,  the  club  that  Ren  works  in,  are  seen  as  “valuable  
assets,”  “the  cream  of  the  crop”  (7).  Prostitutes  outside  the  club  are  viewed  as  “hazardous  waste”  
(7). The line between the female body and a material commodity, be it property or waste, has
been erased, allowing for the understanding of human bodies as material to be used within
systems of capital.
This  view  of  the  body  as  commodity  becomes  even  more  problematic  in  Atwood’s  
description  of  Toby’s  experience.  Toby  works  at  SecretBurgers,  a  fast  food  chain  that  sells  
hamburgers  made  of  whatever  meat  can  be  found.  Toby  comments,  “The  meat  grinders  weren’t  
100 per cent efficient; you might find a swatch of cat fur in your burger or a fragment of mouse
tail.  Was  there  a  human  fingernail,  once?”  (Atwood  33).  In  this  truly  disturbing  moment,  offered  
in a off-handed manner by Toby, the line between human bodies and meat for the production of
hamburgers is dissolved. As a result of this Soylent-Green-like realization, the human is
understood in the same way animals have been understood previously. It is not only the female
reproductive  function  that  has  been  commodified  in  Toby’s  society.  Every part of the human
body  is  commodified:  Toby’s  hair fetches a decent sum of money, and she sells all of her eggs
on  the  black  market  until  “there  were  complications,  so  she  could  never  donate  any  more  eggs,  or  
– incidentally – have  any  children  herself”  (32).  Just  as  ecofemisism  posits,  the  fragmented  body
of woman is divided up and sold across the market. Only valued for its productions, be it parts or
labor, Toby’s  body  is  truly  understood  as  a resource for extraction, as nature has been understood
through the lens of modernity. The body is only valuable in what it can produce, like eggs and
hair, without the previously ethical understanding of the human predicated on autonomy and
self-determination.  Of  her  previous  life,  Toby  says,  “at  least  she  had  something  of  marketable  
value, namely her young ass, and therefore  she  wouldn’t  starve  to  death,  and  nobody  had  to  feel  
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guilty”  (28).  Humanist  values  have  been  reduced  to  market  values,  and  there  is  no  space  for  
understanding the human outside the constraints of capitalism.
The totalized commodification of nature is also clear in descriptions of food as well.
Endangered species become a commodity to be sold and eaten, the worth and pleasure of
consumption  derived  from  their  illegality  and  status  as  rare.  At  one  of  Toby’s  first  jobs,  she  
works at a business that skins rare animals and sells the skins as costumes. The meat of the
animals is then sold to a restaurant called Rarity. “The public dining room served steak and lamb
and venison and buffalo, certified disease-free so it could be cooked rare – that was what
“Rarity”  pretended  to  mean.  But  in  the  private  banquet  rooms…  you  could  eat  endangered  
species. The profits were immense; one bottle of tiger-bone wine alone was worth a neckful of
diamonds” (31). The endangered animal trade is strictly illegal, but the corruption in the
corporations  is  rampant:  “There  were  pockets  within  pockets,  with  a  CorpSeCorps  hand  in  each  
one  of  them”  (31).  In  this  society,  nature  is  valued  because  it  is  rare.  However,  it  is  not  rare  due  
to a desire to experience nature as a space or uncommodifiable other outside  of  modernity’s  
expansion  of  culture,  but  is  instead  rare  and  desirable  as  a  commodity.  Nature’s  commodification  
is  complete.  In  the  society  Toby  experiences  outside  the  God’s  Gardeners,  there  is  no  access  to  
nature as a space for experiencing alternatives to culture, instead everything, from human bodies
to nature, is given up to systems of capital that demand commodity.
Capitalist representational structures, compounded by the material realities of severe
overpopulation and resource shortages, have allowed human bodies to be seen in the same way
nature  has  been  viewed  through  the  lens  of  modernity.  Atwood’s  depiction  of  this  society  is  truly  
chilling – when  “nature”  runs  out,  and  “rare”  is  a  commodity,  society  tries  to  maintain its
previous cultural practices by feeding human bodies into the system. In all of the cases, humans
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have just become grist to run through the mill of capitalist, corporation-run system. Again
echoing  Heidegger’s  warning  in  “The  Question  Concerning  Technology,”  bodies are not valued
with  an  intrinsic  dignity  that  promotes  their  ethical  treatment.  Instead,  understood  as  “standingreserve”  human  bodies  are either commodities themselves or raw material to be used, as labor or
material, for the production of  more  commodities.  Heidegger’s  description  of  standing  reserve  
serves as the end of representation. Carried to its conclusion, the representations of bodies in
terms of marketable value erase the ethical constraints that would have prevented bodies from
being understood as material resources for commodification. It is this dominant culture that the
God’s  Gardeners  react  against  in  The Year of the Flood, creating their own dissident subculture
that tries to reinvest the human body with meaning.
THE PRODUCTION OF SUBCULTURE
THE GOD’S GARDENERS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF STYLE
The  God’s  Gardeners  that  Atwood  describes  represent  a  subculture  existing  both within,
and against the dominant, capitalist, corporation-run society. Primarily,  the  God’s  Gardeners  
react against the police state represented by the CorpSeCorp Men and the commodity fetishism
of genetic engineering that attempts to preserve an illusion of youth and longevity. Their distrust
of the controlling features of these cultural productions causes them to leave society and live
apart on a rooftop garden, growing their own food, rejecting the products of corporations, and
living  sustainably.  According  to  Adam  One,  the  leader  of  the  God’s  Gardeners,  the  dominant  
cultures  “view  us  as  twisted  fanatics  who  combine food extremism with bad fashion sense and a
puritanical  attitude  toward  shopping.  But  we  own  nothing  they  want,  so  we  don’t  qualify  as  
terrorists”  (48).  Due  to  the  totalizing  effects  of  the  dominant  culture  and  the  understanding  of  
bodies as human resources, it has become imperative that the Gardeners find an existence outside

40

of culture if they are to maintain their understanding of the body as something pre-capitalist, with
an integrity all its own.
If, as Jameson insists, we must find a space outside culture from which to effectively
comment upon the dominant culture, subcultures are a good place to look. However, insofar as
subcultures extend from and are defined by a parent culture, such investigations may prove
limiting. Alan Sinfield frames this question as, “This  is  a  key  question:  if  we  come  to  
consciousness within a language that is continuous with the power structures that sustain the
social  order,  how  can  we  conceive,  let  alone  organize,  resistance?”  (Sinfield  748).  As we
understand ourselves and our relations with others within languages produced by dominant
systems of power, what chance do we have of altering our social and political realities while we
continue to operate within their terms? Atwood provides one possibility through her depiction of
the  God’s  Gardeners.  
Atwood’s  God’s  Gardeners,  while  still  marginally  subject  to  the  capitalist  system  – they
sell  “all  natural”  products  at  the  local  market  – provide  a  qualified  space  “outside”  dominant  
culture by which to achieve critical discourse. In his review of The Year of the Flood, Jameson
claims:
Oryx gave us the view of this system from the inside and as it were from above, even
though there really does seem to be no oligarchic ruling elite nor any totalitarian party or
dictatorship on the old-fashioned modernist dystopian model; The Year of the Flood gives
us the view from below – always, as we well know, the most reliable vantage point from
which to gauge and map a society. (Jameson 1)
Jameson affirms the position of subculture as the best position from which to examine the parent
culture.  Within  the  space  of  Atwood’s  narrative,  perspectives  within  the  God’s  Gardeners  
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provides a place to look in at culture from the perspective of a disempowered and subordinate
class, making an effective critique of her fictional world. Furthermore, part of the power of
God’s  Gardeners  comes  from  their  existence  both  in  culture  and  outside  culture.  This  both/and  
position makes them both politically and socially active within society while ideologically
outside of society, and thus able to effectively comment upon the dominant culture.
The  God’s  Gardeners’  existence  as  a  subculture  can  be  formulated  in  numerous  ways.  
Dick  Hebdige’s  model  from  Subculture and the Meaning of Style provides a useful framework
for  understanding  the  Gardeners’  reappropriation  of  objects  from  the  dominant  culture,  while  
Jean  Baudrillard’s  formulation  is  intriguing  in  demonstrating  the  Gardeners  as  a  political  and  
social  virulence  developing  out  of  the  dominant  culture’s  controlling practices. In either case,
what  stands  is  the  God’s  Gardeners’  growth  out  of  the  dominant  culture  that  allows  them,  in  their  
maturity, to exist in radical opposition to culture. This maturity, I believe, demonstrates their
political efficacy and personal  survival,  resisting  “incorporation”  (Hebdige  92)  into  the  parent  
culture, and, ultimately, allowing them to carry on to repopulate the earth.
In  one  of  his  sermons,  Adam  One  claims,  “I  have  enjoyed  viewing  the  excellent  Tree  of  
Creatures created by our Children  from  the  plastic  objects  they’ve  gleaned  – such a fine
illustration  of  evil  materials  being  put  to  good  uses!”  (51).  Hebdige,  in  “Subculture  and  Style”  
argues  that  “tensions  between  dominant  and  subordinate  groups  can  be  found  reflected  in  the  
surfaces of subculture – in  the  styles  made  up  of  mundane  objects  which  have  a  double  meaning”  
(431).  The  God’s  Gardeners’  use  of  plastic  to  create  the  Tree  of  Creatures  demonstrates  both  the  
“evil”  of  the  plastic,  a  symbol  of  the  dominant  culture  and  ecological peril, as well as the Tree of
Creatures,  ostensibly  a  reminder  of  the  connectedness  of  all  things.  Further,  these  “objects  
become  signs  of  forbidden  identity,  sources  of  value”  (Hebdige  431).  The  forbidden  identity  
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represented by the Tree of Creatures is one in which the self is instantiated in nature, as opposed
to the alienating practices of the dominant culture. The forbidden identity uncovered by this
subcultural  object  is  truly  a  “source  of  value,”  as  the  object  takes  from  the  parent  culture  and  
reforms  into  a  symbol  of  the  cosmology  of  the  God’s  Gardeners.    Through  this  borrowing  from  
the  parent  culture,  the  God’s  Gardeners  are  able  to  imagine  an ethical place for themselves
outside consumer culture, in the Tree of Creatures.
The  Gardeners’  reuse  of objects in a desire to live sustainably serves their material aims
as well. The Gardeners attempt to use as few resources as possible, gleaning what they need from
waste  containers  behind  stores  and  restaurants.  Ren  claims,  “There  was  no  such  thing  as  garbage,
trash,  or  dirt,  only  matter  that  hadn’t  been  put  to  a  proper  use”  (69).  As  opposed  to  human  
bodies, which consumer culture may label as raw material or waste, the Gardeners recuperate the
value of matter in all cases. While these understandings of matter are still teleological, often
determined by use, they still recuperate the meaning of matter in a way that resists the norms of
consumer  culture’s  designations  of  waste.  
In  support  of  this  view,  critic  Raymond  Malewitz  claims,  the  God’s  Gardeners  “reject the
specific premise held by the pleebanders that each object has a singular use value and that once
that  use  has  been  fulfilled,  it  is  perfectly  acceptable  to  discard  the  commodity’s  husk”  (535).  
Instead, the Gardeners use the practice of recycling to confirm their ideology so that through
“God-given  powers  of  creativity…  even  the  useless  and  discarded  may  be  redeemed  from  
meaninglessness”  (160).  This  act  “reobjectifies  the  world,”  according  to  Malewitz  (535).  As  
such, the creation of the Tree of Creatures and other acts of recycling may be seen as a kind of
analog  for  the  Gardeners’  desire  to  reinvest  human  bodies  with  meaning.  Bodies,  termed  
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meaningless and disposable by contemporary culture, are recuperated from their status as
commodity.
CULTURAL CONTROL & POLITICAL VIRULENCE
In  addition  to  Hebdige’s  fomulation  of  subculture  through  the  development  of  style,  the  
creation of the kind of subversive, reactionary subculture is described by Jean Baudrillard in his
essay  “Prophylaxis  and  Virulence.”  Baudrillard claims that when a system desires to exert
ultimate control over all aspects itself, it will attempt to purge all difference. As a result of this
removal, new, harmful elements arise within the system that will eventually lead to its
destruction. Baudrillard  claims  that  the  growing  technological  enhancements  will  “occasion  a  
technological  purification  of  bodies”  (34).  Technology offers us the opportunity to control all
aspects of our bodies, purging disease and weakness. However, bodies then become less
effective  in  dealing  with  threats  as  such  developments  tend  to  “strip  the  human  body  and  mind  of  
their  systems  of  initiative  and  defence”  through  which  the  bodies  “become  eminently  vulnerable  
to  science  and  technology”  (34).  Our attempts at control will inevitably fail as we cannot know
all weaknesses, or as our attempts create new, virulent responses. Of the resulting condition,
Baudrillard  claims,  “we  are  all  potentially  immunodeficient,”  but  in  more  than  the  literal  
understanding (35).
As the police force in The Year of the Flood is privatized, it seems as though this is
exactly  the  trajectory  Atwood’s  society  has  taken.  “CorpSeCorps  started  as  a  private  security  
firm  for  the  Corporations,  but  then  they’d  taken  over  when  the  local  police  force  collapsed for
lack of funding, and people liked that at first because the Corporations paid, but now
CorpSeCorps  were  sending  their  tentacles  everywhere”  (25).  The  CorpSeCorps  began  
consolidating power across the world in an effort for total control. While this control was
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welcome at first, the protection it offered was limited. The safety such police forces were
intended to maintain prevented citizens from being able to distinguish between safety and
control, and when CorpSeCorps became a totalizing power, citizens were unable to fight back;
they were immunodeficient.
Through this desire for purification, systems, writ large, end up engineering their own
downfall. It has long been said that dictatorships make enemies of their subjects, but this desire
for purification in our contemporary landscape threatens all political systems and all individual
lives.  Baudrillard  claims,  “Seeming  to  eliminate  all  external  aggression,  they  secrete  their  own  
internal  virulence,  their  own  malignant  reversibility”  (35).  Baudrillard continues to give
examples of such virulence, including electronic viruses, terrorism, and cancers, indicating that
the  “absence  of  otherness  secretes  another,  intangible  otherness:  the  absolute  other  of  the  virus”  
(37). Otherness cannot be purged, and attempts to do so will only create more virulent,
threatening  strains  of  otherness.  Chaos,  in  systems,  is  necessary  because  it  “imposes  a  limit  upon  
what  would  otherwise  hurtle  into  an  absolute  void”  (39).  Systems  recognize  limits  of  what  can  
and cannot be controlled through the understanding of chaos. The threat of chaos imposes an
order on the system, allowing the system to self regulate. If we attempt to purge the chaos from
the system, the limits cannot be set, and virulence abounds.
Control characterizes  the  dystopian  society  seen  in  Atwood’s  Oryx and Crake and The
Year of the Flood. As the government has privatized its military force, the CorpSeCorps, fear
proliferates. Society is broken into a bourgeoisie society in the sterilized Compounds and the
sick, impoverished, depraved existence in the Pleeblands. As the Compounds attempt to prevent
virulence from entering their sterilized bubble, viruses engineered in the Compound laboratories
proliferate, unchecked. In one example from Oryx and Crake, Crake’s  own  mother  dies  of  such  a  
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virus, despite her Compound job, and Crake watches her literally dissolve before his eyes. In the
ultimate example of such a virulence, the virus engineered and incorporated into the BlyssPluss
pill (a pill intended as a prophylactic that increased sexual pleasure with the side effect of
sterilization) kills off the majority of the human race, Compound and Pleeblands alike. Though it
was intended as species genocide to purge the earth of the human race, very few human bodies
have the capability to ward off such a virus, as we see in The Year of the Flood. At the end of the
novel, there are perhaps twenty individuals left in what was the United States after the virus runs
its course. Such is the Waterless Flood.
Aside from this literal virulence plaguing society, a political virulence is exemplified by
the  God’s  Gardeners.  The controlling police state witnessed in their society has created
significant distrust of corporations, and as a result subcultures, like the Gardeners, have broken
off from society, forming their own community in a rooftop garden. Governmental attempts to
control the population have resulted in the creation of such a group that does not consume
Compound-produced food or drugs, opting instead to grow their own food and herbs for
medicinal use. This ideology eventually saves them, but their existence represents the way in
which the controlling state secreted dissent. The domestic terrorists represented by the
Maddaddam  group,  possibly  the  focus  of  Atwood’s  third  installment, express the extreme of this
dissension as they attempt to destroy the parent culture by reappropriating its own technological
products to destroy American infrastructure.
The  God’s  Gardeners  are  born  of  the  totalizing  control  of  the  dominant  culture and their
representative  CorpSeCorps  men.  However,  the  ideology  of  the  God’s  Gardeners  makes  room  
for  the  otherness  that  Baudrillard  discusses  in  “Prophylaxis  and  Virulence.”  In  one  sermon  given  
by  Adam  One,  he  says,  “True,  we  are  sometimes  infested with nanobioforms we would prefer to
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be  without,  such  as  the  Eyebrow  Mite,  the  Hookworm…  not  to  mention  the  hostile  bacteria  and  
viruses.  But  think  of  them  as  God’s  tiniest  Angels,  doing  His  unfathomable  work  in  their  own  
way…”  (160).  The  God’s  Gardeners  have written otherness into their own cosmology. Instead of
trying  to  purify  their  bodies  and  landscape,  they  accept  the  viruses  as  part  of  the  “polyphonic  
symphony  of  Creation”  (160).  In  making  room  for  this  existence,  they  accept  chaos  as  a  limit,  
and, ultimately, it helps them survive.
Baudrillard’s  formulation  of  subculture  seems  to  resonate  with  Alan  Sinfield’s  perception  
of the political efficacy of subcultures. Sinfield evokes the metaphor of faultlines to imagine the
relation between subcultures and dominant cultures. Instead of framing a space outside of culture
by which to comment on dominant practices, Sinfield argues that “…the  social  order  cannot but
produce faultlines through which its own criteria of plausibility fall into contest  and  disarray”  
(Sinfield 755). Like Baudrillard’s  depiction,  Sinfield  suggests  that  the  creation  of  dissent,  or  
virulence, as a condition of apparatuses of power or dominance. Furthermore, Sinfield claims
“My  argument  is  that  dissident  potential  derives  ultimately  not  from  essential  qualities  in  
individuals (though they have qualities) but from conflict and contradiction that the social order
inevitably  produces  within  itself,  even  as  it  attempts  to  sustain  itself”  (Sinfield  752).  Dissident
power does not emerge from individuals, but from groups, existing within the faultlines of
dominant  cultural  practices.  The  God’s  Gardeners  represent  a  model  of  this  dissent  as,  in  their  
community, they reveal the cracks in ideology and devise an alternate ideology that promote new
ethical understandings.
In these formulations of subculture, we see the Gardeners taking up objects from a parent
culture and reappropriating these objects for material and ideological ends, as in the Tree of
Creatures.  Additionally,  we  see  the  Gardeners  as  a  “secreted”  virulence  in  Baudrillard’s  
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formulations, as they are born of the controlling aspects of their dominant, corporate-controlled
culture. Their interactions with the dominant culture, either in virulent response or the
reinterpretation of material objects, asserts their status as both a part of, but separate from their
contemporary, commodity-defined culture. It is this both/and space that ultimate empowers the
God’s  Gardeners  and  allows  them  to  survive  the  Waterless  Flood.  
CULTIVATING THE GARDEN
In  looking  at  both  Hebdige’s and  Baudrillard’s  descriptions  of  the  creation  of  a  
subculture, we can find the space that Jameson talks about as necessary for political effectivity.
Fredric Jameson claims that
distance  in  general  (including  “critical  distance”  in  particular)  has  very  precisely been
abolished in the new space of postmodernism. We are submerged in its henceforth filled
and suffused volumes to the point where our now postmodern bodies are bereft of spacial
coordinates and practically (let alone theorhetically) incapable of  distantiation…  
(Postmodernism 48-9).
I have argued, and will argue, that the model provided by Atwood demonstrates space within the
context of the novel – the  God’s  Gardeners  – to maintain this type of distance. The subcultural
space the characters occupy, avoiding contact with the destructive representations of society,
maintains a critical distance by which discourse and practice are able to proliferate in opposition
to  a  dominant  culture.  The  “radical  eclipse  of  nature”  (Jameson  49)  lifts,  and  the  category of
nature is reaffirmed as a space from which to critique culture. As  such,  the  God’s  Gardeners  exist  
as both a part of culture, as they use the discarded objects of culture to make meaning for
themselves, and apart from culture, as they shun the contemporary norms and critique capitalist
practices.  Their  Rooftop  Garden  thus  stands  as  a  material  space  and  metaphor  for  the  Gardeners’  
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position. Their rooftop is situated within a city, on top of an abandoned building, a space in
which they grow their food and look down at the rest of culture. This literal distance becomes
metaphorical  as  the  Gardeners’  ideology  matches  their  physical  position.  They  are  both  a  part  of  
culture, and distant from culture, and thus able to critique culture without being subsumed by the
contemporary ideologies responsible for ecological ruin.
However, insofar as the garden represents a new investment in nature, the material
conditions of “nature”  may  need  to  be  redefined  to  maintain  nature’s  existence  as  a  theoretical  
category. This  is  largely  the  issue  Dana  Philips  argues  in  “Is  Nature  Necessary?”  Philips  argues  
that  modernists  understood  nature  as  “the  affirmation  of  the  self  in  a  transcendent  moment  of  
realization in which the dross of culture (language, sexuality, history) is clarified, melting away
to  reveal  the  roots  of  culture  in  nature,  and  human  nature”  (205).  In  a  postmodern  world,  
however,  “representation  has  supplanted  presence”  (206)  and  “Such  encounters  with  artifice,  
where one expects to find only the real thing, suggest  that  we  have  found  a  substitute  for  ‘the  
natural  world’:  in  the  postmodern  world,  nature  no  longer  seems  to  be  necessary”  (215).  As  seen  
in both Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood,  “nature”  has  been  significantly  redefined  as  
“culture.”  This  end of representation, described best by Heideggerian standing reserve, subsumes
all underneath the heading of culture. On a material level, this may very well be true. The
conflation of nature and culture is quite complete in our own world. In one example, William
Cronon claims that our contemporary constructions hold the wilderness up as “an  island  in  the  
polluted sea of urban-industrial modernity, the one place we can turn for escape from our own
too-muchness”  (69).  However,  he  argues  that  wilderness  “is  quite profoundly a human creation –
indeed the creation of very particular human cultures at very particular moments in human
history”  (69).  This  structuration of wilderness,  often  thought  of  as  “nature”  par  excellence,
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threatens to erase all previous understandings  of  what  nature  may  be.  Certainly,  within  Atwood’s  
world, the boundary is erased. Pigoons, hybrids of pigs and humans, bred for human transplant
organs and a bit too rational as a result, represent one instance of this blurred boundary (18).
Recalling Oryx and Crake, Jimmy and Crake continually get in arguments about whether the
newly  engineered  organisms  are  “real.”  Jimmy  continually  struggles  with  these  categories,  
attempting,  in  his  postmodern/posthuman  world  to  equate  “real”  with  “nature”  and  “artificial”  
with  “man-made.”  In  Atwood’s  world,  these  categories  cannot  hold.  Culture  is  absorbing  
everything around it, including the realm formerly known as nature. In the face of this conflation,
however, we must, as Philips and Jameson argue maintain an imaginative boundary between
nature and culture, even if that boundary may not materially hold in our postmodern world. As
Philips argues:
Meanwhile,  we  ought  to  begin  what  Jameson  has  called  “the  practical  reconquest  of  a  
sense  of  place,”  a  practice  he  terms  “cognitive  mapping.”  Cognitive  mapping  entails  the  
establishment  of  “an  imaginary relation to the real”:  which  I  understand  to  mean  the  
imagination of the real as real, as something that matters, to use a verb with possibly
Heideggerian resonances. (219)
What Philips argues for is an imaginative structure revealing an ethical framework that, despite
the materially confusing appearance of things, maintains nature as nature. In this way, reality is
not given up to proliferating representations, but is instead  grounded  again  a  “reconquest”  of  a  
space  apart  from  culture.  The  God’s  Gardeners,  and  the  imaginative  structure  that  they  base  their  
epistemological and ontological understandings upon, is most definitely a reconquest – they
imagine themselves in relation to a originary nature that resists the controlling aspects of culture
and reinterprets otherness, not as something to be eliminated but embraced. While their position
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could be understood as yet another ideology, their imaginative structure affirms them as both in
nature and apart from nature, both animal and cultural. The remainder of this chapter will focus
on the important implications of this position as an ethic emerges out of this ideology that
bridges  the  gap  between  Crake’s  posthumanism  and  Jimmy’s  humanism.  
IMAGINATIVE STRUCTURES AND ETHICAL UNDERSTANDING
This discussion of subculture yields a model in which the imaginative structures of
subculture are remain available while the material practices may be prevented by the dominant
culture. Sinfield describes the movement from dissent to practice as follows, “It  is  through  such  
sharing that one may learn to inhabit plausible oppositional preoccupations and forms – ways of
relating to others – and hence develop a plausible oppositional selfhood. That is how successful
movements  have  worked”  (Sinfield  749).  As  the  God’s  Gardeners  work  together  to  practice  their  
resistance, they are able to construct an alternate selfhood, based in an alternate understanding of
the relation between self and other. Additionally,  Baudrillard’s  discussion  of  the  necessity  of  
such otherness allows us to enter an investigation of the cosmology of the subculture of the
God’s  Gardeners.  Created  as  a  reaction  to  the  totalizing  representations  of  the  dominant  culture  
that demands human bodies on the order of resource and resistance to the control of culture by its
occupation of a subcultural space, the cosmology of the Gardeners provides a means by which to
use  imaginative  structures  toward  the  creation  of  an  ethic.  “You  create your own reality, the
horoscopes  always  said,  and  the  Gardeners  said  that  too”  (284).  The  construction  of  their  way  of  
life  chooses  to  reaffirm  the  natural,  creating  a  new  “cognitive  map”  and  an  imaginary  space  
outside culture for nature. The Gardeners believe in a one-ness of all things, so that they see the
destruction  of  an  other  being  a  destruction  of  the  self:  “Do  not  eat  anything  with  a  face!  Do  not  
kill  your  own  Soul!”  (40)…  “For  when  a  species  dies  from  Earth,  We  die  a  little  too”  (314).  A  
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crime against  the  other  is  a  crime  against  the  self  within  the  Gardeners’  cosmology,  making  a  
space for otherness and chaos that Baudrillard suggests.
Ren  and  Toby’s  entrance  into  the  God’s  Gardeners  introduces  readers  to  a  cosmology  
that, though based in Christianity, has taken several liberties with the original particulars of the
religion.  The  ethic  proposed  by  the  God’s  Gardeners  writes  in  a  sustainable  relationship  with  the  
land, a strong distrust of corporations, a faith in the evolutionary process, and an understanding
of human fallibility and the failings of language. They, as a subculture, have reappropriated the
Christian mythos and carefully constructed a cosmology that stands in direct opposition to the
mainstream commodity culture. Largely, the Gardeners believe in the coming Waterless Flood:
A massive die-off of the human race was impending, due to overpopulation and
wickedness, but the Gardeners exempted themselves: they intended to float above the
Waterless Flood, with the aid of the food they were stashing away in the hidden
storeplaces they called Ararats. As for flotation devices in which they would ride out this
flood, they themselves would be their own Arks, stored with their own collections of
inner animals, or at least the names of those animals. Thus they would survive to
replenish the Earth. Or something like that. (47)
Toby,  though  a  member  of  the  God’s  Gardeners,  finds  that  “the  prayers  were  tedious,  the  
theology scrambled – why be so picky about lifestyle details if you believed everyone would
soon  be  wiped  off  the  face  of  the  planet?”  (47).  However  problematic,  these  “fugitives  from  
reality”  present  a  useful  cosmology  constructed  against  dominant,  Western  societal  norms.
The  basis  for  much  of  the  Gardener’s  cosmology  relies  on  their  belief in the ecological
connectedness  of  all  things.  Many  of  Adam  One’s  sermons  stress  these  connections:  “We  thank  
Thee, oh God, for having made us in such a way as to remind us, not only of our less than
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Angelic being, but also of the knots of DNA and RNA that  ties  us  to  our  many  fellow  creatures”  
(53).  Adam’s  sentiments  in  these  prayers  and  sermons  often  waver  between  scientific  materiality  
and spiritual mysticism in describing the connections between beings. Scientific understandings
are used to strengthen, rather than undermine, the belief in a god or spirit that unites all beings.
Adam’s  sermons  demonstrate  a  valiant  attempt  to  recuperate  scientific  knowledge  in  a  way  that  
does not reduce bodies to material, but instead enforce an understanding of the matter as
inextricably tied to the spirit or soul.
In  addition  to  the  Gardeners’  attempts  to  create  a  more  ecological  ethic,  they  reject  much  
of the ideology of Western civilization and modernity, which they believe is responsible for the
failings of culture  in  their  world.  In  Toby’s  first  interaction  with  the  God’s  Gardeners,  they  save  
her from her work at SecretBurgers and her violent boss, Blanco. As Adam One preaches to the
crowd,  he  says,  “I  studied  epidemics,  I  counted  diseases  and  dying  animals,  and  people too, as if
they  were  so  many  pebbles.  I  thought  only  numbers  could  give  a  true  description  of  Reality”  
(40). In this moment, Adam One registers his past beliefs as wrong, in that he viewed human
bodies  as  numbers,  recalling  Heidegger’s  warning  of  the  creation  of  a  “standing  reserve”  of  
“human  resources.”  He  rejects  traditional  models  of  empiricism  – the  notion  that  “numbers  could  
give  a  true  description  of  Reality”  – for a new model of thinking, elucidated in his sermons, as an
ecological ethic vested in reality that has the ability to see the human as a subject, not a number.
The development of civilization, typically lauded as Hegelian progress, instead signals a
continually  Fall  to  the  God’s  Gardeners:  
According to Adam One, the Fall of Man was multidimensional. The ancestral primates
fell out of the trees; then fell from vegetarianism into meat-eating. Then they fell from
instinct into reason, and thus into technology; from simple signals into complex grammar,

53

and thus into humanity; from firelessness into fire, and thence into weaponry; and from
seasonal mating into an incessant sexual twitching. Then they fell from a joyous life in
the moment to the anxious contemplation of the vanished past and distant future. (188)
Instead of viewing these aspects of culture, technology, humanity, rationality, language, selfconsciousness, and pleasure, as indicators of progress, the Gardeners reverse the narrative of
civilization  radically.  Instead  they  are  “bent  towards  an  Earth  restored  to  balance”  (276).  Finally,
when  the  Waterless  Flood  comes,  “all  the  works  of  Man  will  be  as  words  written  on  water”  
(312). The Gardeners see the coming destruction as wrought by God for the chance to repopulate
the Earth and instill a more ecological ethic.
When Toby questions  the  cosmology  given  by  the  God’s  Gardeners, Adam One, the
leader,  claims,  “That  being  the  case,  we  need  to  push  popular  sentiment  in  a  biosphere-friendly
direction by pointing out the hazards of annoying God by a violation of His trust in our
stewardship”  (241).  Toby  replies,  “What  you  mean  is,  with  God  in  the  story  there’s  a  penalty”  
(241).  The  cosmology  of  the  God’s  Gardener’s  may  be  consciously  constructed,  but  they  accept  
it as such because it inspires an ethic at odds with a parent culture that threatens to destroy
humanity.  According  to  Hannes  Berthaller,  “It  is  not  enough  to  simply  survive  – what is needed
is  a  symbolic  order  within  which  the  fact  of  survival  can  appear  as  meaningful  and  good”  
(Bergthaller 738). The Gardeners have created a belief system where there are ethical categories
that  serve  to  govern  actions.  Sustainability,  and  the  resulting  survival,  is  “meaningful  and  good”  
while consumerism and subsequent death are evil.
However, the God depicted by the Gardeners is quite qualified as opposed to the typical
understanding of the Christian God. When speaking of God, the Gardeners continually refer to
His  words  as  the  “human  words  of  God”  in  recognition  of  human  fallibility  and  the  failings  of  
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language  (11).  Instead,  “God  cannot  be  held  to the literal and materialistic interpretations, not
measured through Human measurements, for His days are eons and thousand ages of our time
are  like  an  evening  to  Him”  (11).  Shown  in  relief  to  the  assumptions  of  Western  empiricism,  the  
Gardeners affirm the limitations of the human and of knowledge, avoiding the anthropocentric
assumptions that allowed for the ecological destruction of the earth.
Extending out of this belief in the fallibility of human understanding is a distrust of
representational structures, such as language. The Gardeners are urged to avoid writing things
down. “Beware  of  words.  Be  careful  what  you  write.  Leave  no  trails,” Ren  reflects.  “They  told  
us to depend on memory, because nothing written down could be relied on. The Spirit travels
mouth to mouth, not from thing to thing: books could be burnt, paper crumble away, computers
could  be  destroyed”  (6).  Representations,  which  have  allowed  for  the  human  body  to  be  seen  a  
resource, as well as language, which is imperfect, from a poststructuralist view, prevents the
Gardeners from relying on language in any form.
Most importantly, in contrast to the alienating aspects of the dominant culture that
understand  human  bodies  as  resources,  Toby’s  work  with  the  God’s  Gardeners  instead,  quite  
literally,  allows  the  body  to  be  understood  as  part  of  nature.  Toby  reflects,  “Her  own  hands  are  
getting thicker – stiff  and  brown,  like  roots.  She’s  been  digging  in  the  earth  too  much”  (16).  The  
body  is  seen  as  a  natural  being  and  “a  gift  from  God  and  you  must  honour  that  gift”  (378).  The  
cosmology offered by the Gardeners reinvests the body with intrinsic worth, not materialist,
commodifiable value. In contrast, when Toby must leave the Gardeners to escape from her
former boss, Blanco, she is stuffed into a duck  suit  to  hide  her  identity.  “Oh  great,  thought  Toby.  
You  quack  with  your  foot,  you  talk  through  your  earhole.  I  won’t  ask  how  to  do  any  other  bodily  
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functions”  (258).  Her  body,  once  meaningfully  grounded  in  nature,  is  symbolically  disoriented  as  
she is forced to leave the Gardeners.
In this discourse surrounding the body, Atwood indicates the dual nature of
representationalism. Representation, preformed by capitalism, allows for human bodies to be
seen as resources for the production of more commodities. However, the life-affirming
representation, grounded in an ethic that describes how the self should relate to the other,
prevents the objectification of human bodies and allows for continued human existence. Many of
the  God’s  Gardeners  do,  in  fact,  survive  the  Waterless  Flood.  As  the  virus ravages the human
population, the Gardeners were not infected since they scorned corporation-produced
supplements. They lock themselves in the arks of their bodies and wait for the virus to run its
course. They live off their stored food, and emerge later, whole.
What Atwood ultimately argues for is the necessity of imaginative structures. She
highlights the slippery slope of representationalism, but ultimately affirms the ethic taken from
the  imaginative  structure  of  the  God’s  Gardeners  by  demonstrating their survival. Imaginative
structures allow for material objects to be held within categories for ethical consideration,
combating the ephemeral, changing nature of material in a technological society. Structures such
as these provide epistemological ground  for  the  understanding  of  matter.  The  God’s  Gardeners  
maintain the imaginative category of nature, though they are continually faced with examples of
its illusory presence. However, maintaining the distinction allows for the ethical framework to
which they subscribe and carry through to the new world they will inhabit after the Waterless
Flood. The cosmology of the individuals in The Year of the Flood is obviously constructed, but
constructed in a dialogical ethic that situates the individual body in a more responsible
relationship  with  the  land.  In  doing  so,  the  God’s  Gardeners  are  able,  albeit  through  

56

representation,  to  maintain  a  conception  of  the  material,  “natural”  self  to  combat  the  ubiquity  of  
representations offered up by commodity culture. In this way they are able to prevent the
dialectic of man versus wild that Annette Kolodny characterizes in The Lay of the Land:
But such speculations are only the beginning: the more we understand how we use
language and, conversely, how (in some sense) language uses us, the stronger the
possibility becomes that we may actually begin to choose more beneficial patterns for
labeling and experiencing that mysterious realm of phenomena outside ourselves and,
hopefully, with that, better our chances for survival amid phenomena that, after all, we
know  only  through  the  intercession  of  our  brain’s  encoding.  (Kolodny  147)
Instead,  the  God’s  Gardeners,  recognizing  the  representation  of  the  human  body  offered  up  by  
the parent culture and the fallibility of such language and representations, choose to understand
their bodies differently, and are ultimately saved as a result. In the novel, Toby represents the
epitome of this position, as she continually struggles with true belief or faith in the convoluted
theology of the  God’s  Gardeners.  When  she  expresses  these  doubts  to  Adam  One,  he  says,  “  ‘In  
some  religions,  faith  precedes  action…  In  ours,  action  precedes  faith.  You’ve  been  acting  as  if  
you believe, dear Toby. As if – those two words are very important to us. Continue to live
according  to  them,  and  belief  will  follow  in  time’”  (168).  The  Gardeners  may  recognize  their  
theology as constructed, but it does not necessarily matter. Instead, the action preceding belief,
the conscious action of follow a certain set of representations, helps the Gardeners emerge from
the Waterless Flood.
In  Atwood’s  The Year of the Flood, we experience a world in which we can no longer
distinguish between nature and culture. Human bodies are no more than resources for the
production of commodities, and the totalizing effects of capitialism are carried through to their
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disturbing  ends.  In  order  to  combat  the  realities  of  this  world,  the  God’s  Gardeners  imagine  an  
ethic that resituates the human within the natural, creating a subcultural space for practice and
critical discourse that is imperative within this society. More importantly, Atwood provides us
with a model for ethics that demonstrates a more ecological understanding of our world as well
as a prescient critique of our own commodity-driven culture that is only a few removes from her
fictional  future.  In  “Margaret  Atwood,  the  Land,  and  Ecology,”  Ronald  B.  Hatch,  claims,  
“Atwood  has  something  in  common  with  recent  ecocentrist  writers  in  her  rejection  of  the  
anthropormorphic viewpoint and their struggles to re-position humanity as one species among
many  in  a  web  of  natural  connections”  (181).  The  imaginative  structure  of  the  God’s  Gardeners  
certainly  demonstrates  Atwood’s  tendency,  as  it  develops  an  ethic  that  sees  the  human  as  both  a  
part of nature and a part of culture, and this inclusive position demands an acknowledgment of
other subjectivities, human and non-human, that leads to the ethical treatment of all.
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CHAPTER 3: IMAGINING BOUNDARIES IN ATWOOD’S FICTION
In Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood, Atwood demonstrates the harmful
consequences of understanding and representing the human body and nature as resource to be
used for the production of more goods in a capitalist system. While Oryx and Crake
demonstrates humanist and posthumanist alternatives entering the post-apocalyptic world, The
Year of the Flood continues  Atwood’s  diagnosis  of  the  divide  between  nature  and  contemporary  
culture. More importantly, The Year of the Flood provides us with both a new imaginative
structure that resists the destructive tendencies of science, technology, and capital, and a model
by which to begin to establish this system in our understanding and interactions with others. In
the  subcultural  space  of  the  God’s  Gardeners,  we  begin  to  see  a  space  emerge that could continue
to promote ecological understanding and cultural criticism in a politically effective manner.
The  imaginative  structure  depicted  by  the  God’s  Gardeners  stresses  both  the  ecological  
and spiritual connectedness of all things. While the concept of a God is used to enforce these
beliefs, the cosmology of the Gardeners largely works to negate the empiricism,
commodification, and utilitarianism rendered by a contemporary culture that demands that
everything be understood as material for the production of more goods. In Atwood’s  second  
novel, Surfacing, she investigates what a true ecological existence might look like. Surfacing,
written  in  1972,  stands  as  an  important  example  of  Atwood’s  continued  preoccupation  with  
issues concerning the human’s  relationship  with  the  environment.  In  the  novel, the human
narrator living as animal ultimately proves dissatisfying since the narrator denies her markers of
humanity – rationality and creativity – that allow for connections amongst others of her species.
It  is  important  to  return  to  this  novel,  not  just  to  understand  the  scope  of  Atwood’s  thinking  on  
the subject of nature and culture, but also because it provides a necessary qualification to
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Atwood’s  later  work.  In  our  contemporary  world,  a  natural existence may be desirable, but it is
not the answer to the questions Atwood poses in Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood.
Atwood does not promote the human returning to a natural state, because this existence lacks
meaning without communities formed through interactions with other, and through language.
Furthermore, this lack of community between humans prevents large scale change on the social
or political level that would help to save not only individuals, but all of society. After this
discussion of Surfacing, I will then investigate the conversation Atwood creates in these three
novels, and the possibilities for ethical involvement with others that resist our contemporary
understandings. This chapter will continue to investigate these new understandings of the
relation between self and other,  turning  to  Donna  Haraway’s  work.  Finally, I will look at the
political possibilities of these new understandings as a way of avoiding the ecological ruin
Atwood depicts in her novels.
SURFACING, OR IMAGINING A NATURAL EXISTENCE
It should be noted that investigating new ecological ways of being in the world has long
been  a  concern  of  Atwood’s.  Surfacing,  Atwood’s  second  novel,  describes an unnamed narrator
rejecting culture and living on her own in nature. The narrator, searching for her father around
his cabin in the Canadian wilderness, resolves her painful past through her interactions with
nature and the spiritual presences she feels there. She sheds her friends, her clothes, her
language, and her food, wrapping herself in a sheet and living in a makeshift home in the
woodpile. Throughout the course of the novel, the narrator becomes more and more disgusted
with Cartesian dualities that demand a split between the mind and the body as well as Western,
male-dominated,  empiricist  culture,  simply  described  by  the  narrator  as  the  “Americans.”  
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The  narrator’s  frustration  with  culture  is  largely  tied  to  the  destruction  of  others,  human  
and non-human, that cultural systems both condone and perform. The narrator is troubled
throughout the narrative by a dead heron5 that has been hung from a tree by other campers in the
area:
Why  had  they  strung  it  up  like  a  lynch  victim,  why  didn’t  they  just  throw  it  away  like  the  
trash? To prove they could do it, they had the power to kill. Otherwise it was valueless;
beautiful  from  a  distance  but  it  couldn’t  be  tamed  or  cooked  or  trained  to  talk,  the  only  
relation they could have to a thing like that was to destroy it. (118)
In her mind there seems to be no reason for such a death, and the image of the heron begins to
haunt  the  narrator.  The  narrator  claims  that  the  only  way  in  which  the  “Americans”  could  interact  
with the heron was to destroy it. It could not be tamed, resisting the cultural aims of civilization
in controlling nature. It could not be cooked, satisfying utilitarian aims that see nature as
resources to be used by humans to sustain the self or further cultural progress. It could not, in
another method of civilization, be given language by being trained to talk. The heron, resisting
all of the means of being understood within cultural systems, could only be killed as a means of
demonstrating  civilization’s  power  over  nature.  The  dead  heron,  hanging  lynched  from  a  tree,  
becomes a symbol for all the ways in which civilization is able, or unable, to relate to nature. It is
this relation that the narrator continues to interrogate, eventually describing a new relation
through her interactions with the land.

5

Atwood  could  be  evoking  Sarah  Orne  Jewett’s  (date) “A  White  Heron”  in  which  a  young  girl,  
Sylvie, encounters a young hunter that wishes to know the locations of a white heron. Sylvie,
though knowing the location of the heron, refuses the inquiries of the hunter, and keeps the
knowledge  of  the  heron  to  herself.  Atwood’s  evocation  works,  possibly,  to  carry  the  image of the
heron toward our postmodern society.  Jewett’s  text  is  often  read  as  a  Romantic, feminist text.
The dead heron in Surfacing seems to read as both an evocation and a representative death of
Romantic sensibilities about nature.
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As she and her companions fish, she becomes increasingly troubled by human
interactions  with  nature,  not  only  in  the  senseless  killing  of  the  heron.  “Thud  of  metal  on  
fishbone,  skull,  neckless  headbody,  the  fish  is  whole.  I  couldn’t  anymore,  I  had  no  right  to.  We  
didn’t  need  it,  our  proper  food  was  in  tin  cans.  We  were  committing this act, violation, for sport
or  amusement  or  pleasure,  recreation  they  called  it,  these  were  no  longer  the  right  reasons”  (121).  
Even though the narrator and her companions eat what they kill, the narrator can no longer find
justification for such violence. All the food that they needed existed in tin cans in the cabin and
thus there was no reason to kill the fish. This death, while not as senseless as the heron hanging
in  the  tree,  is  still  a  death  that  cannot  be  justified  in  the  narrator’s  mind.  However, in this
moment, the narrator demonstrates her limited capability to understand what exactly would be a
natural death. They may not need to kill the fish; however, the reliance on tin cans for food only
serves to dislocate the violence the narrator finds so distasteful. The tin cans do not represent a
better alternative to the fishing she and her companions do, but instead demonstrate the
narrator’s  confusion  about  ethical  choices  in  the  murky  space  between  nature  and  culture.  In  the  
narrator’s  logic,  the introduction of technology, equated with culture, into the killing of creatures
seems  to  be  a  source  of  her  dissatisfaction.  “If  we  dived  for  them  and  used  our  teeth  to  catch  
them, fighting on their own grounds, that would be fair, but hooks were substitutes and air
wasn’t  their  place”  (127).  By  using  hooks  and  not  allowing  the  fish  to  fight  in  its  own  
environment, the humans are, in a sense, not fighting fair. Again,  the  narrator’s  confusion  about  
the natural world is demonstrated. As she romanticizes a more natural human existence, she
ignores or is ignorant of the fact that humans can be considered apex predators, and are unlikely
to  “fight  fair”  in  any  case.  In  this  way,  the  narrator  equates  ethical  and  natural,  whereas,  in  
nature, ethical considerations do not exist as such. Natural systems are governed by rules outside
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the realm of cultural constructed ethics. In any case, the narrator believes that if the human was
once again animal, there would be some fairness to the battle for food. Atwood does not seem to
promote  vegetarianism,  but  instead  argues  for  a  fair  fight.  Later  in  the  novel,  after  the  narrator’s  
transformation,  she  claims,  “I  can  catch  a  bird  or  a  fish,  with  my  hands,  that  will  be  fair”  (187).  
For the narrator, there is a sense of ethical fairness in beings fighting, one-on-one, using only
their bodies. Technology has alienated humans from their formerly animalistic, pre-cultural
forms,  and  the  “surfacing”  the  narrator  undergoes  involves  a  recuperation  of  this  former  state.  
The  narrator’s claims about animals and their ethical treatment are quickly expanded to
include  humans  as  well.  The  narrator  claims,  “Anything  we  could  do  to  the  animals  we  could  do  
to  each  other:  we  practiced  on  them  first”  (122).  This  warning  extends  her  preoccupation with
the treatment of animals to the treatment of humans as well. If the senseless killing of animals
does not evoke the ethical distinctions the narrator wishes, she sees little hope for the ethical
treatment of humans as a result. The narrator continues,
The innocents get slaughtered because they exist, I thought, there is nothing inside the
happy killers to restrain them, no conscience or piety; for them, the only things worthy of
life were human, their own kind of human, framed in the proper clothes and gimmicks,
laminated. It would have been different in those countries where an animal is the soul of
an ancestor or the child of a god, at least they would have felt guilt. (129)
The only humans that are worth treating ethically are those that conform to cultural standards,
“framed  in  the  proper  clothes  and  gimmicks”  (129).  Further,  the  killers  and  oppressors  contain  
nothing that would allow for ethical treatment, and the narrator becomes nostalgic for a more
animistic culture, in which the existence of the spirit of the animal was understood. If animals
were understood within familial or spiritual traditions, ethics would follow this ontology. The
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narrator’s  sentiments  in  this  passage  echo  David  Abram’s  discussion  of  oral  traditions  in  The
Spell of the Sensuous:  “The  ‘body’  – whether human or otherwise – is not yet a mechanical
object  in  such  cultures,  but  is  a  magical  entity,  the  mind’s  own  sensuous  aspect,  and  at  death  the  
body’s  decomposition  into  soil,  worms,  and  dust  can  only  signify  the  gradual  reintegration of
one’s  ancestors  and  elders  into  the  living  landscape,  from  which  all,  too,  are  born”  (15).  The  
narrator is nostalgia for this animistic tradition; however, there is little hope of finding these
connections that the narrator hopes to recuperate within current cultural understandings.
Finally, the narrator places much of the blame for the lack of ethical treatment of others
on the Cartesian separation between mind and body: Cogito ergo sum. Abram, like many others,
credits Descartes with being one  of  the  first  to  formulate  this  distinction.  As  a  result,  “material  
reality came to be commonly spoken of as a strictly mechanical realm, as a determinate structure
whose  laws  of  operation  could  be  discerned  only  via  mathematical  analysis”  (Abram  32).  This
divorce between the thinking mind and the acting body is defined, by the narrator, as the problem
of language. Part of the new imagination the narrator calls for involves the rejection of language,
which continually hinders and angers the narrator. She feels as though language is responsible
for the fragmentation she feels as she unable to express the pure emotions she feels and her mind
is  continually  split  from  her  body.  She  claims,  “Language  divides  us  into  fragments,  I  wanted  to  
be  whole”  (147).  Due to this frustration, she will continually reject language, opting for a pure
experience of nature. Similar to her discussion on fishing, where technology creates an unfair
advantage for humankind, language and other cultural systems make the human into machine. In
discussing  her  boyfriend,  Joe,  the  narrator  claims,  “For  him  truth  might  still  be  possible,  what  
will preserve him is the absence of words; but the others are already turning to metal, skins
galvanizing heads congealing to brass knobs, components and  intricate  wires  ripening  inside”  
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(160). Only the absence of language, the essential technology that has often served to define the
human, can prevent culture turning human bodies away from nature and into machines. The
narrator’s  position  recalls  another  of  Abram’s  assertions  in  The Spell of the Sensuous. Like
Atwood,  Abram  claims  that  without  nature,  “we  have  no  distance  from  our  technologies,  no  way  
of  assessing  their  limitations,  no  way  to  keep  ourselves  from  turning  into  them”  (x). Echoing the
frustrations  of  he  God’s  Gardeners,  Abram  suggests,  without  access  to  nature,  our  bodies  become  
increasingly  mechanized.  Atwood’s  depiction  of  the  mind,  or  rationality,  as  a  mechanical  knob  at  
the top of the head, becomes a metaphor for the cultural transformation of the understanding of
bodies.
In addition to language, the narrator of Surfacing finds fault with the spatial orientation of
the human body in maintaining the split between body and mind. As in her discussion of Joe, she
frequently characterizes the head as a knob separated from the body - a situation that forecloses
upon any possibility of understanding the mind and body as part of a singular organism:
The  trouble  is  all  in  the  knob  at  the  top  of  our  bodies.  I’m  not  against  the  body or the
head either: only the neck, which creates the illusion that they are separate. The language
is  wrong,  it  shouldn’t  have  different  words  for  them.  If  the  head  extended  directly  into  the  
shoulders  like  a  worm’s  or  a  frog’s  without  that  constriction, that  lie,  they  wouldn’t  be  
able to look down at their bodies and move them around as if they were robots or
puppets; they would have to realize that if the head is detached from the body both of
them will die. (75)
This detachment between mind and body, depicted by the narrator as problem of the neck,
prevents humans from seeing the mind and the body as one. Furthermore, language, in giving
different words for head and body enforces this division. As a result, the body is alienated, seen
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as a robot or puppet, and controlled by the mind. The split between the mind and body is a lie, in
the  narrator’s  understanding,  and  she  continually  looks  for  ways  to  transcend  this  split.  
Much  of  the  narrator’s  frustration  with  the  Cartesian  split  seems  to  agree  with  Abram’s  
discussion of the body as it relates to our experience of the world. Abram, employing
phenomenology, argues that that body is key in our understanding of the world. The thinking
mind would have nothing to think about, were it not for the sensory information provided by the
body.  The  body,  then,  “is  that  mysterious  and  multifaceted  phenomenon  that  seems  always  to  
accompany  one’s  awareness,  and  indeed  to  be  the  very  location  of  one’s  awareness  within  the  
field  of  appearances”  (Abram  37).  In  discussion  Merleau-Ponty,  Abram  argues,  “Most  of  us  are  
accustomed  to  consider  the  self,  our  innermost  essence,  as  something  incorporeal”  (45).  
However,  “the  living  body  is  thus  the  very  possibility  of  contact,  not  just  with  others,  but  with  
oneself – the very possibility  of  reflection,  or  thought,  of  knowledge”  (45).  All  thought,  indeed,  
the entire sense of self that has constituted the Cartesian mind, cannot exist without the body.
Through the body, we are placed within a world that is in constant reciprocity with the self.  “Far  
from restricting my access to things and to the world, the body is my very means of entering into
relation  with  all  things”  (Abram  47).  Abram  suggests  that  it  is  the  perceptive  capability  of  the  
body that will allow us to see the world, not as inert matter, but as a constant vibrant force in
interaction with us.
The  narrator’s  revelation  in  Surfacing seems  to  mirror  Abram’s  call  for  a  more  animistic  
understanding of the world. The  narrator’s  preoccupation  with  the  consumption  of  animals  and  
her disgust with the divorce between mind and body come together as the narrator begins to
imagine a religiously oriented ethic that will allow for her transformation toward a more
animalistic way of being:
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Whether it died willingly, consented, whether Christ died willingly, anything that suffers
and  dies  instead  of  us  is  Christ;;  if  they  didn’t  kill  birds  and  fish  they  would  have  killed  
us. The animals die that we may live, they are substitute people, hunters in the fall killing
the deer, that is Christ also. And we eat them, out of cans or otherwise; we are eaters of
death, dead Christ-flesh resurrecting inside us, granting us life. Canned Spam, canned
Jesus, even the plants must be Christ. But we refuse to worship; the body worships with
blood and muscle but the thing in the knob head will not, wills not to, the head is greedy,
it consumes but does not give thanks. (141)
In this important passage, the narrator imagines the animals and plants humans consumed as
Christ, a being that dies so that humans may live. Animals die so that humans may continue to
live, and live without killing each other. She sees this death as a resurrection within the
consuming body that worships that which it has consumed. However, the head, that knob, refuses
to grant Christ-like status to that which is consumed, but the body, she claims, worships that
which is consumed in a proper way. This revelation, redefining the problems of Cartesian duality
as well as the death of animals, will guide the narrator through her transformation.
As a  result  of  her  transformation,  the  narrator’s  perception,  understanding  of  the  world,  
and  material  existence  are  all  changed.  She  burns  all  images  of  her  past,  and  “When  nothing  is  
left intact and the fire is only smoldering I leave, carrying one of the wounded blankets with me,
I  will  need  it  until  the  fur  grows”  (182).  She  takes  one  blanket,  imagining  a  transformation  of  her  
body  in  the  near  future.  She  first  eats  from  her  father’s  garden,  but  soon  rejects  this  food,  as  it  is  
cultivated. She moves into the woods, eating only those plants she finds there. In addition to
shedding  cultural  forms  of  sustenance,  she  sheds  her  language  as  well:  “Sight  flowing  ahead  of  
me over the ground, eyes filtering the shapes, the names of things fading but their forms and uses
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remaining,  the  animals  learned  what  to  eat  without  nouns”  (151).  Instead  of  relying  on  language  
to make sense of things in the world, she relies on pure perception based in images. As the
narrator rejects language, she is able to identify closely with elements of language and, in a
sense,  become  these  things.  “The  animals  have  no  need  for  speech,  why  talk  when  you  are  a  
word.  I  lean  against  a  tree,  I  am  a  tree  leaning…  I  am  not  an  animal  or  a  tree,  I  am  the  thing  in  
which the trees and animals move and  grow,  I  am  a  place”  (187).  The  action  of  her  body,  leaning  
against a tree, becomes transformed into the thing itself as she becomes a tree leaning. As
language falls away, so too does the separation of her body and the natural world she inhabits.
She becomes the place itself. Citing Merleau-Ponty from Phenomenology of Perception, Abram
describes  this  new  ontology  one  in  which  “we  may  ultimately  describe  perception  as  a  mutual  
interaction,  an  intercourse,  ‘a  coition,  so  to  speak,  of  my  body  with  things’”  (Abram 55). The
narrator  blends  with  the  landscape,  becoming  the  tree  and  becoming  the  place.  “So  the  
recuperation of the incarnate, sensorial dimension of experience brings with it the recuperation of
the living landscape in which we are corporeally embedded”  (Abram  65).  This  new,  animistic  
sentiment, provides the narrator with a way of understanding herself as both a part of the world,
while still maintaining her human self within the world.
These realizations give way to a larger understanding of the world. Shortly before her
boyfriend, Joe, left for the mainland, she believes she has become pregnant. As a result of her
newfound awareness of her body, she feels the procreative nature of the earth. She reimagines
the heron, no longer seeing it as an image of destruction wrought by culture, but instead as a
image  of  connection  between  all  elements  of  the  earth.  “I  remember  the  heron;;  by  now  it  will  be  
insects, frogs, fish, other herons. My body changes, the creature in me, plant-animal, sends out
filaments in  me;;  I  ferry  it  secure  between  death  and  life,  I  multiply”  (172).  The  narrator’s  
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transformation allows her to recognize cycles of life and death, and her body can now be
understood  within  the  context  of  the  systems  of  the  earth:  “If  our  bodies  lived  in  the earth with
only the hair sprouting up through the leaf mold it would seem as if that was all we were,
filament  plants”  (151).  This  image  connects  all  beings,  human  or  otherwise,  rooting  them  in  the  
earth.
Like Oryx and Crake, Surfacing ends with the narrator musing on whether or not to move
toward connection with another human or to stay, alone, in nature. The end of the novel is not a
utopic vision of a peaceful existence in nature; instead the narrator considers the option of
returning to culture. The narrator acknowledges that culture will not accept her. Looking in the
mirror,  she  says,  “This  was  the  stereotype,  straws  in  the  hair,  talking  nonsense  or  not  talking  at  
all. To have someone to speak to and words that can be understood: their definition of  sanity…  
They  would  never  believe  it’s  only  a  natural  woman,  state  of  nature…”  (196).  As  she  mutters  to  
herself in the mirror, she views herself not through the lens of nature but through the lens of
culture. She has become a stereotype, a concept that can only have meaning within culture. She
recognizes that she will be considered insane since she does not conform to cultural norms.
Those  in  culture  will  “never  believe”  or  will  refuse  to  believe  that  she  is  simply  a  natural  woman.  
As Abram says, within cultural  assumptions  there  is  “a  real  inability  to  clearly  see,  or  focus  
upon, anything outside the realm of human technology, or to hear as meaningful anything other
than  human  speech”  (27).  Culture  and  cultural  systems  seem  to  preclude  all  else;;  there  is  a sense
that nature cannot be seen within culture. At the end of the novel, there is no way for the narrator
to resolve the gap between nature and culture as she stands in the woods looking out at the shore.
She  says,  “To  trust  is  to  let  go.  I  tense  forward, towards the demands and questions, though my
feet  do  not  yet  move”  (198).  Despite  the  narrator’s  transformation,  she  is  still  caught  between  the  
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demands and questions of the mind, and the movement of the body. The final pages of the book
do not indicate which the narrator chooses, but her inability to decide at the end of the novel
suggests that the body/mind and nature/culture cannot be resolved.
This resolution is largely what Atwood has investigated in much of her fiction. While
Surfacing provides us with an idealistic vision of what might be gained, the ending calls into
question  the  feasibility  of  such  an  existence  in  today’s  world.  Additionally,  Surfacing, though
dealing with many of the themes present in Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood, shows us
a personal vision of existence within nature. On one hand, Atwood, like her narrator in
Surfacing, is hesitant in giving up the ties to other human beings that culture provides. Becoming
wholly animal means giving up rationality, creativity, and imagination, leading to a deeply
dissatisfying existence in the world. On the other hand, however, something must change in our
current understanding in the world if we are to envision a different future than that described by
Oryx and Crake. This way of being in the world cannot be maintained in the social or cultural
sphere. Instead, Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood provide us with cultural commentary
and political models where the ethics described by Surfacing may be imagined in larger, social or
political contexts.
In this way, Atwood critiques yet another humanist position: the primacy of the
individual. Instead, focusing on the individual as a source of truth or meaning denies the way in
which cultural systems, or ideologies, are formed. According to Alan Sinfield,
The essentialist-humanist approach to literature and sexual politics depends upon the
belief that the individual is the probable, indeed necessary, source of truth and  meaning…
But thinking of ourselves as essentially individual tends to efface processes of cultural
production and, in the same movement, leads us to imagine ourselves to be autonomous,
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self-determining. It is not individuals but power structures that produce the system within
which we live and think, and focusing upon the individual makes it hard to discern those
structures; and if we discern them, hard to do much about them, since that would require
collective action. (Sinfield 749)
Sinfield’s  observations  are  reflected  in  the  dissatisfying  ending  of  Surfacing, and in Atwood’s  
discussion of the possibilities for social or political change in The Year of the Flood. Personal
visions of a new life cannot expose culturally produced ideologies in a manner that can call for
change. Systems of meaning are produced collectively, and must be changed collectively.
Individuals, like Jimmy or the narrator of Surfacing, cannot alter ideological structures
personally, though humanism may suggest this power. Instead, it is the collective that must work
to change these ideologies if we are to imagine a more positive future. The remainder of this
paper will focus on possibilities for altering dominant ideologies toward the development of
more ethical alternatives.
“PLEASURE IN THE CONFUSION OF BOUNDARIES”
The unresolved ending of Surfacing hints at a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the
nature/culture  divide.  The  narrator  desires  to  live  a  “natural”  existence  away  from  a  culture  that  
has fractured her identity and her body. At the same time, she desires the connection with other
humans that is provided by communal culture. There is no way of existing in both of these
spaces  in  the  narrator’s  contemporary  world.  Similarly,  Oryx and Crake sets up dualist divisions
such as nature/culture and real/artificial. Jimmy, in his liminal position as last man, finds it
increasing difficult to maintain these categories and the meaning associated with them due to
increasing technological innovations. Additionally, his humanist perspective fails him in his
posthuman world as he is unable to relate words to his surroundings or feel empathy with the
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Crakers.  Finally,  the  cosmology  of  the  God’s  Gardeners  depicted  in  The Year of the Flood, while
not perfect, takes steps towards resolving the disparity between nature and culture while
promoting an ecological understanding that stresses the connectedness of all things, human and
nonhuman, self and other, nature and culture.
This connectedness, within our contemporary world, has been practically and
theoretically imagined in contemporary conversations about nature and technology. In Donna
Haraway’s  seminal  A Manifesto for Cyborgs, she theorizes the concept of the cyborg as a means
by which to combat problematic conceptions of nature and culture. Like Atwood, Haraway
identifies great importance in the imagination as a means by which to achieve a more sustainable
understanding  of  the  human.  As  Haraway  states,  “I  am  making  an  argument  for  the  cyborg  as  a  
fiction mapping our social and bodily reality and as an imaginative resource suggesting some
very fruitful couplings”  (8).  Like  the  God’s  Gardeners,  who  provide  the  most  hopeful  model  for  
this new understanding, this new cosmology, that of the cyborg, is based in the imagination and
is understood as a fiction, a necessary construction. Expanding on this point, Haraway claims:
In  the  traditions  of  ‘Western’  science  and  politics  – the tradition of racist, maledominated capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of
nature as resource for the productions of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self
from the reflections of the other – the relation between organism and machine has been a
border war. The stakes in the border war have been the territories of production,
reproduction, and imagination. This essay is an argument for pleasure in the confusion of
boundaries and for the responsibility in their construction. (8)
While  Haraway  echos  the  concerns  of  many  of  Atwood’s  characters  – Surfacing’s  narrator’s  
disgust  with  Western  empiricism  and  Cartesian  thought,  Jimmy’s  frustration  with  artificiality,
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and  the  God’s  Gardener’s  ecofeminist  concerns  – she finds the source of these dissatisfactions.
In looking at the works discussed in this study, these dissatisfactions stem from a desire to
confine objects within ideological boundaries that can no longer hold. The answer is not to
reverse the dualism, privileging, say, nature over culture, but to instead find pleasure in the
confusion  of  these  boundaries.  Like  the  God’s  Gardeners,  Haraway  argues  for  boundaries  (as  
boundaries must exist for such pleasurable confusion to occur), but these boundaries must be
responsibly  constructed.  While  we  may  need  a  new  cognitive  map,  or  a  new  “imaginary  relation  
to  the  real,”  to  again  invoke  Dana  Philips,  there  is  something  to  be  gained  in  the  confusion  of  the
boundaries  we  have  constructed  (Philips  219).  In  Haraway’s  cyborg,  “Nature  and  culture  are  
reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation of incorporation by the other.
The relationships forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical
domination,  are  at  issue  in  the  cyborg  world”  (Haraway  9).  Those  structures  that  have  demanded  
domination of others, or others understood as Heideggerian standing reserve, are erased in this
reworking, providing an ethic very similar to  that  desired  by  the  God’s  Gardeners.  
Haraway’s  work  stresses  not  only  the  pleasure  in  the  blurring  of  boundaries  but  the  
powerful  political  resonances  a  position  such  as  the  cyborg  may  hold.  Haraway  states,  “The  
cyborg is the ontology; it give us our politics. The cyborg is the condensed image of both
imagination and material reality, the two joined centers structuring any possibility of historical
transformation”  (8).  In  this  passage,  Haraway  suggests  that  her  definition  of  political  change  
depends on  the  imagination’s  ability  to  create  and  implement  a  change  in  material  reality,  
allowing  for  “historical  transformation.”  Haraway  continues,  “So  my  cyborg  myth  is  about  
transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people
might  explore  as  one  part  of  needed  political  work…    a  slightly  perverse  shift  of  perspective  
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might better enable us to contest for meanings, as well as for other forms of power and pleasure
in  technologically  mediated  societies”  (12-13). The cyborg, in particular, representing the blurred
boundary  of  nature  and  culture,  is  a  “perverse”  position  that  is  better  able  to  contest  the  meanings  
and power structures normalized by contemporary culture.
The  characters  of  Atwood’s  I  have  discussed  in  this  study all struggle with moving
forward  in  “technologically  mediated  societies”  (Haraway  13).  All  are  disgusted  with  some  
aspect of their society, and attempt to encourage a new, sometimes misguided, ethic within it. To
begin, the narrator of Surfacing attempts to reverse the dualist boundary between nature and
culture, and become wholly natural. This position ultimately fails because the answer to a better
imaginative relationship with the more than human world does not exist in rejecting culture and
the human entirely, but instead in finding power and pleasure in the blurred boundary, without
obscuring the boundary altogether. In her transformation, she gives the self up to her hungers and
instincts, a position that is empowering at first, but ultimately dissatisfying. The narrator desires
connection between herself and other humans. While she is more aware of nature, she has lost an
integral part of herself that does not allow for meaningful existence. Furthermore, to create
political change in the world, community and other social structure must exist. The answer to
political crises, for Atwood, is not to run away from culture and live in the woods. This
conclusion forecloses upon any possibility of widespread political and social change. Our
ecological situation was not created by single individuals, but the whole of civilization, and must
be solved by the whole of civilization. Denying culture and returning to nature will not help
create the large-scale change necessary for our global society to remain sustainable. In her two
latest novels, Atwood attempts to find a way to resolve these important aspects of nature and
culture without denying space to either.
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Like Surfacing’s  protagonist, Crake ultimately sees society as not worth saving.
However, unlike Surfacing’s  narrator,  his  disgust  with  society  stems,  not  from  a  romanticized  
understanding  of  nature,  but  from  his  understanding  of  the  society’s  totalized  artifice  – there is
no difference between representation and reality. His attempt to make a posthuman that denies
humanist impulses in favor of more ecologically constructed being is the extreme case of the
blurred boundary, and, perhaps, even the cyborg. The creation of the Crakers erases important
aspects of the human that allows a boundary between human and animal to exist. As Crake
revises  his  new  species’s  biology,  he  attempts,  though  he  may  not  succeed,  in  erasing  
imagination and creativity – those aspects of the human that are responsible for both ethical and
unethical behavior. His inability to see any good in the world causes him to delete all aspects of
the human that are responsible for atrocities, but in doing so he also erases those aspects that
define the human itself, such as the imagination required for meaningful political and social
change.
Though  there  is  the  position  of  empowerment  in  Haraway’s  understanding  of  the  cyborg,  
she  also  describes  the  possibility  of  an  “informatics  of  domination”  as  matter  becomes  increasing  
manipulated by those skilled with knowledge and power (20). She warns that,  “we  are  living  
through a movement from an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system
– from all work to all play, a deadly game”  (20).  Crake  may  stand as an example of the
informatics of domination par excellence. His understanding of human bodies their genetic codes
as material to be rewritten and rearranged, demonstrates his understanding of the world as all
play  without  ethical  constraint  in  the  treatment  of  these  materials.  As  such,  “No  objects,  spaces,  
or bodies are sacred in themselves; any component can be interfaced with any other if the proper
standard,  the  proper  code,  can  be  constructed  for  processing  signals  in  a  common  language”  (22).  
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In  Crake’s  world,  genetic  code  represents  just  this  common  language,  as  he  is  able  to interface
between humans and animals, creating new bodies and new species. In this new understanding of
the world, Haraway expresses some of the same ambivalence Atwood describes in her coinage of
ustopia  since  “potent  oppositional  international  movements [become] difficult to imagine and
essential  for  survivial”  (23).  Movements  that  call  for  radical  change  form  with  increasing  
difficulty in a society that threatens to discard the ethical considerations that governed matter in
favor of infinite play. However, these movements are necessary for survival if we are to demand
ethics from these ever-evolving circumstances. Haraway, like Atwood, does not provide a
solution to these problems but sketches out the great promise and great fear that these new
understandings  give  us.  In  an  answer  to  the  informatics  of  domination,  Haraway  states,  “…the  
phrase should also indicate that science and technology provide fresh sources of power, that we
need  fresh  sources  of  analysis  and  political  action”  (25).  In  my  understanding, Atwood provides
us with the new sources of analysis and action as she investigates old models of understanding
and  creates  a  new  model  for  dissidence  in  the  God’s  Gardeners.  
In this way, Atwood, through her investigation of Jimmy, discards humanist models for
understanding and ethics in her fictional future. Jimmy clings on to humanist values that do not
hold as his past is dissolved and his future becomes uncertain. Of these principles, Haraway
claims,  “It  is  important  to  note  that  effort  to  construct revolutionary standpoints, epistemologies
as achievements of people committed to changing the world, has been part of the process of
showing  the  limits  of  identification…  None  of  ‘us’  have  any  longer  the  symbolic  or  material  
capability of dictating the shape  of  reality  to  any  of  ‘them’”  (16).  Jimmy,  though  he  tries  to  
identify with humans and posthumans, is doomed to fail because identification cannot create
meaningful understandings of his self as part of his environment. Identification does not change
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the  subject’s  understanding  of  the  self;;  it  only  allows  the  self,  for  a  moment,  to  imagine  being  
other,  a  skill  both  limited  and  unfeasible  in  our  time.  Furthermore,  Jimmy’s  humanism  is  limiting  
because is clings too tightly to categories that are no longer accurate in late capitalist
technocracy. Instead of understanding the confusion and flow across boundaries, he still attempts
to set objects and ideas into strict distinctions between human/animal, natural/artificial, and
real/simulacra. However, as his interactions with Crake and his experiences with the Crakers
demonstrate, these distinctions cannot adequately order his world any longer. In his reliance on
his humanist dogma, he finds that his language fails, and he is left in a world devoid of meaning.
As  I  have  said  before,  as  Atwood’s  novels  stand  now,  the  God’s  Gardeners  of  The Year of
the Flood seem to represent the most empowered, ethical, and sustainable group of people we
have  met.  Most  closely  following  Haraway’s  theory  of  the  cyborg,  they  have blurred the
boundary between nature and culture in their rooftop garden. The subcultural space is always a
blurred area, as it extends out of but contests the dominant culture. The subculture is not cut off
from the dominant culture, but interacts with the dominant culture as information and material
objects  flow  between  them.  However,  in  this  space,  the  God’s  Gardeners  utilize  their  
imaginations  toward  the  creation  of  a  new  cosmology,  an  example  of  Haraway’s  “cyborg  
writing.”  Haraway  claims,  “Cyborg  writing must not be about the Fall, the imagination of a
once-upon-a-time wholeness before language, before writing, before Man. Cyborg writing is
about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the
tools to mark the  world  that  marked  them  as  other”  (33).  While  the  Gardeners  may  be  limited  by  
their imagination of an originary wholeness and their concern with the Fall, they are aware that
they  cannot  go  back.  Nature,  as  it  once  existed,  is  no  longer:  “We  cannot  go  back ideologically
or  materially”  (Haraway  21).  The  Gardeners,  at  their  heart,  are  forward  thinking.  They  envision  
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the future as an Eden, but a highly qualified and hard fought place, more mythologically than
materially Edenic in the traditional sense. Their new writing, conferred orally through their
hymns and sermons, is certainly about survival as well as about the appropriation of the
contemporary  material  culture  that  marked  them,  and  everyone  else,  as  “other,”  as  material  and  
commodity to be used by systems of capital.
The  God’s  Gardeners  provide  an  example  of  Haraway’s  cyborg  theory  not  only  
methodologically,  but  ideologically  as  well.  In  cyborg  theory,  “The  dichotomies  between  mind  
and body, animal and human, organism and machine, public and private, nature and culture, men
and  women,  primitive  and  civilized  are  all  in  question  ideologically”  (22).  Additionally,  “One  
should expect control strategies to concentrate on boundary conditions and interfaces, on rates of
flow across boundaries – and not on the  integrity  of  natural  objects”  (22).  In  defining  themselves  
relationally, both to culture and to nature, the dichotomies between these boundaries become
increasingly murky, however, the Gardeners seem to take much solace in this fact. They do not
deny their human sensibilities but also wish to be more like the animals they revere. They
maintain boundaries, but construct them responsibly, and understand the flow across these
boundaries. Atwood, who considered calling The Year of the Flood by the alternate title Serpent
Wisdom,  sums  up  the  Gardeners’  sentiment  in  the  following  hymn:  
God gave unto the Animals
A wisdom past our power to see
Each know innately how to live,
Which  we  must  learn  laboriously…

The Serpent is an arrow bright
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That feels the Earth’s  vibrations  fine
Run through its armoured shining flesh,
And all along its twining spine.

Oh, would I were, like Serpents6, wise –
To sense the wholeness of the Whole,
Not only with a thinking Brain,
But with a swift and ardent Soul. (236)
From  Haraway’s  cyborg  theory,  we  can  see,  within  the  study  of  the  God’s  Gardeners,  a  way  of  
understanding the world as a relational whole that does not negate the construction of
boundaries, but stresses the importance of the transgression and flow across these boundaries.
Echoing  Jameson,  Haraway’s  theory  provides  a  new  map,  based  in  an  imaginative  construction,  
that  holds  important  political  resonances  echoed  in  the  Gardeners’  existence  as  a  subculture.  
THE POWER AND POSSIBILITY OF THE IMAGINATION
To conclude,  I  return  to  Jimmy’s  assertion  from  Oryx and Crake. “When  any  civilization  
is  dust  and  ashes,’  he  said,  ‘art  is  all  that’s  left  over.  Images,  words,  music.  Imaginative  structure.  
Meaning – human meaning, that is – is defined by them. You have to admit that’”  (167).  What
exists  in  all  of  Atwood’s  writing  is  the  primacy  of  the  human  imagination,  and  its  ability  to  
persist through hardship as the ultimate form of survival. The answer to issues of ecological peril
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It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Atwood’s  and  the  Gardeners’s  use  of  serpent  imagery  serves  as  
yet another careful appropriation of meta-narrative for the creation of their own ideology.
Though the Gardeners use a distinctly Christian setting for their cosmology, they reject the
connotation of the serpent as evil, as it represents the promise of forbidden knowledge and the
resulting Fall. Instead, in their recuperation of a more pagan understanding of the serpent, they
again emphasize the natural, biological qualities of the serpent body as opposed to the cultural
meaning given to the serpent through Christian narrative.
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is not to deny the human imagination, opting for a more natural existence, as in Surfacing.
Instead, Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood test  Jimmy’s  hypothesis.  The  apocalypse  
occurs, and the remaining individuals are left with nothing but their imaginative structures to
guide them in their new  world.  Atwood’s  third  novel,  Maddaddam, will likely explore existence
in this new world, what imaginative structures persist as the community attempts to survive. The
Gardeners, for their part, have given us a view of what political methodology and communal
ideology  could  help  remake  the  world.  According  to  Bergthaller,    “This  is,  one  suspects,  the  
reason  why  Atwood  chose  a  Christian  background  for  the  Gardeners…  the  Christian  emphasis  
on the absolute sovereignty of an extramundane God resonates with Atwood’s  own  views  on  the  
equally  momentous  sovereignty  of  the  human  imagination”  (741).  The  human  imagination  holds  
much possibility, and is responsible for much evil and much good. However, the responsible
construction of boundaries modeled by the Gardeners, provides us with an importance
representation of what a more ethical, meaningful, and sustainable world could look like.
Atwood’s  novels  exist  as  an  imaginative  exercise  in  what  our  world  could  like  – a much
needed exercise as we begin to feel, more acutely,  our  dire  ecological  situation.  Atwood’s  
creation of this world, an ultimate act of human imagination, allows for us, as readers, to imagine
outside of our contemporary world to see what is coming and what we can avoid as we enter a
heightened technological  future.  In  his  study  of  Atwood,  Gerry  Canavan  claims,  “The  
apocalypse is the only thing in our time that seems to have to the capacity to shake the
foundations  of  the  system  and  ‘jumpstart’  a  history  that  now  seems  completely  moribund  – the
only power left that could still create a renewed, free space in which another kind of life might
be  possible”  (139).  In  imagining  the  apocalypse,  and  forcing  readers  to  experience  the  
apocalypse  along  with  her,  Atwood  provides  a  “free  space”  similar  to  that  of  the Gardeners. In
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the text of the novel, we experience an outside of culture, a space from which to look back from
our fictional future and critique our contemporary mode of being. Atwood, in laying bare our
possible future, allows us to see what might be possible and what changes we can make if we
desire to avoid the impending Waterless Flood. Her fiction alerts us to our own blurred positions,
our own politically promising situations. In recognizing our potential futures, we are able to
create responsible boundaries, and find pleasure in their confusion instead of attempting to reify
or erase these differences. Ultimately, we are able to value our own imaginations and our ability
to envision a better existence for ourselves and for our future.
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CONCLUSION: IMAGINING FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Margaret  Atwood’s  speculation  on  the  ecological  issues,  technological  innovations,  and  
the political and ethical responses to our rapidly changing society leaves us with much to
contemplate as we move into the future. Oryx and Crake shows us the future we could inhabit if
we refuse to impose ethical boundaries on the technologies we create and utilize. The character
of Crake warns us the dangers of science and of what can happen if we lose the differentiation
between representation and reality. Posthumanist understandings must evolve differently if we
are to maintain ethics in the future. Furthermore, Atwood suggests that humanist ideals have
little hope of sustaining us into the future, as our interaction with other becoming increasingly
difficult to define. What is needed is a new imaginative structure that can organize our new
world and help us to move into a more hopeful future.
The  God’s  Gardeners  of  The Year of the Flood are the most hopeful alternative we have
within  the  context  of  Atwood’s  fiction.  The  answer  to  our  technological  circumstance  is  not  to  
return to nature, as does the protagonist of Surfacing, but instead to find a way to understand
ourselves as both animal and culture, and take pleasure the in confusion of boundaries. The
God’s  Gardeners  raise  important  questions  of  political  and  social  change,  and  how  to  enact  these  
desired changes within dominant cultures that demand all material, from bodies to nature, be
given to systems of capitalist technocracy. The Gardeners reveal a political and material space
between nature and culture that allows for critical distance, political empowerment, and personal
survival as they develop their ecological ethic that supports the dignity of all things.
In terms of future directions for this investigation of Atwood, I would like to situate
Atwood’s  ustopia within the larger genres of utopia and dystopia. In Archaeologies of the
Future, Frederic Jameson asserts that utopic and dystopic literature emerge out of specific

82

historical circumstances, and may provide effective political models to encourage social change
(xiv). Atwood consciously engages in this form, and situating her within this tradition may lend
much  to  my  discussion  of  the  political  efficacy  of  Atwood’s  project. Additionally, I would like to
further theorize the space of the garden as it stands, historically, as a place both cultivated and
natural,  demonstrating  the  God’s  Gardeners’  place  as  a  permeable  boundary  that  confuses  the  
categories of cultural and animal.  Finally,  I  am  looking  forward  to  investigating  Atwood’s  final  
installment of the trilogy within the schema developed by this paper. Will better alternatives
arise for dealing with the constraints of capitalism and impending ecological ruin?
Outside  of  the  conversation  surrounding  Atwood’s  novels,  I  would  like  to  engage  with  
other speculative genres, particularly those that suggest the utopic possibilities of technology.
Science fiction, with its focus on modifying the human towards a posthuman or transhuman
being,  is  a  fruitful  area  of  study.  I’m  interested  in  investigating  issues  of  nature,  technology,  and  
futurism as it relates to this genre. More specifically, I would like to study the ways in which
materiality and representation are altered in speculative futures that do not necessarily demand
that humankind (if they can still be called human) exist within bodies. The boundary confusion
within these speculations proliferates, and I would be interested to see how categories are
maintained or erased and how ethics are developed as a result.
Finally, I am always interested in what role literature and art can play in changing our
material,  socioeconomic,  or  political  circumstances.  While  Atwood’s  literature  helps  us  to  
imagine the danger and hope implicit in our future, can her literature help to change anything in
our experience or treatment of the more-than-human world, or others? What are the limits of
literature in inspiring ethics, and what are the possibilities? Are the models Atwood provides
feasible, or are these models increasingly difficult to move from the imagination into action?
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